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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent negotiation of the EU budget and the associated reform of EU Cohesion policy 
have had major policy implications for Spain, the country in receipt of most Cohesion policy 
support in the current programming period (2000-06). EU enlargement, combined with 
relatively rapid growth in Spain, impacted on the eligibility of Spanish regions for Cohesion 
support while also taking the country as a whole beyond the eligibility threshold for the 
Cohesion Fund. As a result, based on the original Commission budget proposals of February 
2004, Spain was facing a reduced Cohesion policy budget of at least a half (to below €30 
billion). This paper first reviews the budget negotiations from a Spanish (Cohesion policy) 
perspective, identifying the key negotiating goals and the extent to which they were 
achieved. It then looks at the outcome of the negotiations for Spain, initially at the 
national level and then in the regions. It highlights the significant differential impacts of 
the cutbacks in Cohesion policy allocations at the regional level and the pressures on the 
Spanish government to modulate the regional impact of the budgetary changes.  
Having considered the funding implications of the new Cohesion policy, the second half of 
the paper is concerned with the regulatory and institutional impacts of the new policy 
regime. Many of the reform proposals fit with Spanish priorities, not least the new rationale 
for Cohesion policy (with its stress on the Lisbon and Gothenburg agendas) and the new 
policy architecture (with all regions eligible for some form of support and with a related 
shift from a geographic to more of a thematic focus). The retention of the key Structural 
Funds principles has also been welcomed in Spain, unsurprising given the wealth of 
experience and expertise built up over three (high-spending) programming cycles. The main 
regulatory concern (as in most Member States) relates to the extent to which the aim of 
introducing a more simplified and devolved approach to Funds’ implementation will be 
achieved in practice. Considering, finally, policy and institutional impacts, the paper brings 
together regional views on the new budgetary and regulatory frameworks before reviewing 
how the new regulations are being implemented in practice. A discussion of the developing 
National Strategic Reference Framework and the related Operational Programmes makes 
clear that the strong emphasis on the Lisbon agenda is not viewed as a constraint in Spain; 
rather, it is felt to fit well with recent Spanish developments and goals. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Setting the agenda 
The debate on the future Cohesion policy for the post 2006 period was launched with the 
publication of the Commission’s Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion in January 
2001. The Spanish government was the first Member State to formally react, expressing its 
concerns in a letter sent to the Commission President, Romano Prodi, in April 2001.1 The 
letter, known as the ‘Aznar Memorandum’, raised the issue of the “statistical effect” of 
enlargement and, controversially, linked accession negotiations with guarantees over future 
receipts of Structural Funds for the existing Member States  
Although the attempt to link enlargement with the reform of the Structural Funds was 
considered unacceptable by the Commission and most Member States, the Spanish 
government reiterated its concerns in the Second Cohesion Policy Forum (May 2001) and the 
informal Ministerial Meeting of EU Regional Policy Ministers (July 2001) which provided the 
first opportunity for the Member States to express general views on future Cohesion policy 
reform. With the onset of the Spanish Presidency in the first half of 2002, more detailed 
exchanges of views between the Member States were held in the Council’s Structural Affairs 
Working Group, on the basis of the Commission’s First Progress Report on Economic and 
Social Cohesion published in February 2002.  
A majority of Member States subsequently submitted their formal positions over the course 
of the next year,2 whilst Commission thinking was further developed in the Second Progress 
Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (February 2003). The Commission’s thoughts were 
examined by the Member States through the Structural Affairs Working Group and, at a 
higher political level, at the informal Ministerial meeting for Regional Policy Ministers under 
the Greek Presidency (May 2003). The Commission published its overall budget proposals for 
the 2007-13 period in February 2004, closely followed by the Third Cohesion Report which 
provided more information on the proposed Cohesion policy.  
1.2 The Commission’s reform proposals 
Following on from this, the Commission’s legislative proposals relating to Cohesion policy 
were formally submitted in July 2004 in the form of one general regulation,3 three specific 
                                                 
1 Regional Policy and Enlargement, Memorandum by the Spanish Government to the European 
Commission, 19 April 2001. 
2 Netherlands (April 2002), Italy (December 2002), France (January 2003), Greece and United Kingdom 
(March 2003), and Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Finland (May 2003). 
3 Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund. COM (2004) 492 final, 14 July 
2004 
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regulations covering each of the funds,4 and a specific regulation for a new instrument for 
managing cross-border cooperation.5 The main aims were to make EU Cohesion policy more 
strategic (focussed on the Lisbon and Gothenburg agendas including annual dialogue in the 
Council of Ministers), more concentrated (both geographically on the least favoured regions 
and thematically on the Lisbon and Gothenburg themes) and more decentralised (with 
simpler, more transparent and more efficient delivery mechanisms). A number of important 
changes were proposed, including a broader rationale for policy; a new architecture of 
Community priorities; and a different implementation system.   
In terms of the new policy rationale, a key change is the emphasis on the Lisbon and 
Gothenburg agendas, with future policy priorities anchored in the themes of innovation and 
the knowledge economy (to promote competitiveness), environment and risk prevention (to 
address sustainable development), as well as labour market support (to improve the 
adaptability of the workforce to changing circumstances in line with the European 
Employment Strategy). For the first time, ‘territorial cohesion’ received significant 
attention, building on the philosophy of the Second Cohesion Report and the commitment 
in the draft (and rejected) EU Constitution ‘to promote economic, social and territorial 
cohesion and solidarity among Member States’. In this context, the remit of EU Cohesion 
policy has been widened to address issues such as urban development, infrastructure 
endowment in educational, health and social services, and the specific problems of areas 
with geographical handicaps (e.g. islands, mountains, border regions). 
Under the ‘new architecture’ for EU Cohesion policy, the current Objectives 1, 2 and 3 will 
be replaced by three new Community objectives: Convergence; Regional Competitiveness 
and Employment; and European Territorial Cooperation. The current instruments linked to 
rural development policy (EAGGF Guidance Section, FIFG) are to be grouped within one 
single instrument under the Common Agricultural Policy (EAFRD) and the Community 
Initiatives (INTERREG, URBAN, EQUAL, LEADER+) will be discontinued as separate initiatives 
and integrated within the mainstream programmes. The creation of a specific legal 
instrument to facilitate cross border cooperation has also been proposed. 
The aim of the Convergence Objective (previously Objective 1) is to support growth and job 
creation in the least developed regions, principally in the new Member States. The ERDF 
and ESF will provide support for investing in human and physical capital; innovation and the 
knowledge economy; encouraging adaptation to socioeconomic change; protection of the 
environment; and improving administrative efficiency. This objective may also be funded 
through the Cohesion Fund. As in the past, the Cohesion Fund will continue to place a 
strong emphasis on supporting Trans-European transport networks, projects of European 
interest and environmental infrastructure. The main proposed innovation is to increase the 
scope for assistance with a stronger focus on sustainable development and the 
                                                 
4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Regional 
Development Fund, COM (2004)495 final, 14 July 2004; Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the European Social Fund, COM (2004) 493 final, 14 July 2004; 
Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a Cohesion Fund, COM (2004) 494 final, 14 July 2004 
5 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European 
grouping of cross-border cooperation (EGCC). COM (2004) 496 final, 14 July 2004. 
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environmental dimension (e.g. supporting energy efficiency or renewable energy). 
Convergence Objective eligibility will continue to be based on GDP (PPS) per head of less 
than 75 percent of the EU average in NUTS II regions. Phase-out and Outermost regions will 
also be included under this Objective.  
The Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective aims to anticipate and promote 
change through a two-fold approach. Regional ERDF-funded programmes will seek to 
improve the competitiveness of industrial, urban and rural areas, while national (or 
territorial where appropriate) ESF-funded programmes will support the introduction and 
implementation of structural reforms in the labour market and strengthen social inclusion 
in line with the priorities of the European Employment Strategy. A key change is that all 
regions outside the Convergence Objective will be eligible for support. Unlike the previous 
period, Member States will have full freedom to determine the list of regions at either 
NUTS I or II level that will be included under the Objective. There is no requirement to 
meet specific national or EU territorial criteria to determine eligibility and zoning will no 
longer apply. However, the appropriate balance between geographical and other forms of 
concentration in drawing-up Regional Competitiveness programmes will be developed in 
partnership with the Commission. Phase-in (“natural growth”) regions will also be included 
within this Objective. 
The Territorial Cooperation Objective will seek to promote the harmonious and balanced 
development of the Union territory, building on the previous INTERREG programme. The 
current Community Initiatives will, as already mentioned, be integrated within the 
mainstream programmes. In addition to strengthening territorial cooperation, the 
Commission has proposed the creation of a single legal instrument to enable the Member 
States and sub-national authorities to manage cross-border programmes more effectively. 
Eligibility will be determined by internal land borders and certain external borders 
including some regions lying on sea borders.  
The Commission is also proposing to make significant changes to the way that EU Cohesion 
policy is implemented. The key principles underlying the Structural Funds – multi-annual 
planning, integrated development strategies, partnership, co-financing and concentration – 
will continue; however, the proposals aim to simplify and decentralise the process further. 
The main features of the proposals are: a new planning framework; one fund per 
programme; rationalised and decentralised procedures for financial management, control 
and additionality; an enhanced partnership principle; a more rigorous approach to 
monitoring; and more results-oriented and flexible evaluation. 
1.3 The structure of the paper 
The Commission’s February 2004 proposals represented the start of a more formal 
negotiation process. This took the form of a twin-track approach, financial on the one hand 
(with the Friends of the Presidency Group helping in the development of the EU budget 
proposals) and regulatory on the other (through the operation of the Structural Actions 
Working Group). This paper makes a similar division. It begins by considering the 
negotiations surrounding the EU budget in general and Cohesion policy in particular (in 
Section 2) before reviewing the Cohesion policy outcomes for Spain and its regions (Section 
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3). It then moves on to review the development of the Structural Funds regulations (in 
Section 4) and their policy and institutional impacts (Section 5). Each section ends by 
discussing some implications for Spain. Section 6 then draws together these concluding 
comments in a brief review of the overall implications for Spain of the Cohesion policy 
reform process. 
2. NEGOTIATING THE BUDGET 
2.1 The Spanish negotiating position on Cohesion policy funding 
The overarching objective for Spain in the negotiation of the 2007-13 Financial Perspectives 
was to ensure a positive net balance over the whole of the period by minimising the 
sharpness of the decline in its budgetary position as far as possible. Central to the pursuit 
of this negotiating goal was the need to increase Spain’s relative position in EU expenditure 
policies (especially through Cohesion policy since, in practice, future CAP resources had 
already been fixed in 2002) and, on the income side, to minimise its contribution to the 
EU’s own resources (an issue closely tied to the future of the UK rebate). 
The first public statement of Spain’s formal negotiating position on the financial aspects of 
Cohesion Policy (and the wider EU budget) was provided by the Minister for Economy and 
Finance, Pedro Solbes, in a parliamentary plenary session in November 2004.6 Underlying 
the government’s position was the view that “Cohesion policy remains a core EU policy, as 
recognised in the draft Constitution and Treaties, and that, for both political and economic 
reasons, it should be allocated an adequate level of resources.” Whilst acknowledging that 
the policy should be made more effective, the Spanish position was that it should not be 
“reduced to a minimum token gesture”. More specifically, the main financial objectives for 
Spain in the negotiations were:7
• Cohesion Fund: A transition period for the Cohesion Fund.  
• Statistical effect (Phase-out) regions: Regions affected by the statistical effect 
should be treated similarly or close to Convergence regions – that is, those regions 
below 75 percent of EU GDP (PPS) per capita.  
• Growth (Phase-in) regions: Regions that have risen above the 75 percent threshold 
should receive a similar percentage of resources as those in a similar situation 
during the current programming period. The region of Cantabria, currently an 
Objective 1 Phase-out region, should also be included within this category.  
• Regional Competitiveness and Employment priority: The Spanish position was in 
favour of the Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective, unlike some of 
the net contributor countries (such as the United Kingdom) which wished to see EU 
Cohesion policy focused on the poorest Member States.  
                                                 
6 Congreso de los Diputados (2004) Pleno y Diputación Permanente, Año 2004, VIII Legislatura, Núm. 
51, Sesión plenaria núm. 47, celebrada el miércoles, 24 de noviembre de 2004 
7 See also Navarro A and Viguera E (2005) Las Perspectivas Financieras 2007-2013 y la Posición de 
España, Documento de Trabajo (DT) Nº 22/2005, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid 
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• Outermost regions: Spain had in the past argued and continued to argue that the 
treatment of the Canary Islands should be improved under the Special Fund for the 
Outermost Regions, so that the Canarias region receives a comparable level of 
support as Convergence Objective regions.  
• Other areas: Spain wished to see better treatment for cities and areas with 
geographical handicaps, such as Ceuta and Melilla, islands and areas with low 
population density. 
• Also of note, under Heading 1a of the EU budget (Competitiveness), Spain sought 
the application of criteria which would favour a more equal distribution of 
resources.  
2.2 Background to the Spanish negotiating position 
In considering the issues of special relevance to Spain in the negotiations, it is useful to 
review current allocations of EU expenditure by Member State, since this obviously impacts 
on Member State views of which budgetary headings are of particular benefit. Information 
on EU spending is published each year by DG Budget.8 An overview of allocated expenditure 
across the EU15 countries by main heading (ie agriculture, structural actions, internal 
policies, plus administrative expenditure) is provided in Figure 1. The data are 2000-03 
averages of the percentages for the four years under review. For comparison purposes, the 
distribution of population by EU15 Member State is also shown (2002 data). 
Figure 1 underlines the current importance to Spain of funding under the structural actions 
heading (that is, EU Cohesion policy). Over the 2000-03 period, Spain was the main 
beneficiary of EU Cohesion policy funding, receiving 30 percent of total EU funding. With 
Cohesion policy accounting for just over one-third of total allocated expenditure across the 
EU, more than half Spain’s allocated expenditure between 2000 and 2003 took the form of 
Cohesion policy funding, well ahead of agriculture (44 percent of the allocated total for 
Spain). By comparison, expenditure allocated to Spain with respect to other (internal) 
policies was low (just 6 percent of the EU15 total) while administrative allocations were 
very low (less than 1 percent). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The latest publication was made available in September 2005 at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/agenda2000/reports_en.htm. The data used in Figure 1 are 
drawn from the September 2004 report. While there are limits and qualifications to the data (see 
Section 2 of the report), it is the only such data available and is the data which informed Member 
State negotiation strategies. 
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Figure 1: Operating Expenditure by Heading and Member State 2000-03 (% EU15 total) 
 
Agriculture 
Structural 
actions 
Internal 
policies 
Total 
allocated Admin 
Overall 
total 
2002 
population 
(% EU15) 
BE 2.28 0.89 12.08 2.49 56.75 5.50 2.72 
DK 2.87 0.32 2.91 1.98 1.00 1.93 1.41 
DE 14.26 14.46 17.29 14.54 3.48 13.93 21.68 
EL 6.25 9.46 3.43 7.15 0.47 6.78 2.89 
ES 14.19 30.02 6.19 18.99 0.82 17.98 10.66 
FR 22.63 7.04 13.16 16.56 8.23 16.10 16.10 
IE 4.09 2.79 1.63 3.46 0.74 3.31 1.03 
IT 12.64 13.64 11.09 12.98 2.84 12.42 15.02 
LU 0.08 0.03 1.57 0.17 19.51 1.24 0.12 
NL 3.02 0.94 6.05 2.51 1.19 2.44 4.24 
AT 2.53 0.93 2.96 2.01 0.37 1.92 2.12 
PT 1.86 10.87 2.57 5.03 0.33 4.77 2.73 
FI 1.92 1.11 2.17 1.67 0.49 1.60 1.37 
SE 1.92 0.96 3.18 1.68 0.52 1.61 2.35 
UK 9.48 6.55 13.71 8.79 3.25 8.48 15.57 
EU 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Operating expenditure as a percentage of total allocated operating expenditure 
EU 58.2 34.7 7.1 100.0 5.9 105.9  
Source: EPRC calculations from European Commission, Allocation of 2003 EU operating 
expenditure by Member State, DG Budget, September 2004. 
The expenditure outcomes in Figure 1 reflect the Cohesion policy commitment 
appropriations agreed at the 1999 Berlin European Council (see Figure 2). Spain was the 
largest beneficiary of the 2000-06 structural actions budget, accounting for almost 27 
percent of total commitment appropriations. Of particular note is the importance of 
Objective 1 funding to Spain, amounting to almost 70 percent of the Spanish structural 
actions budget. The Cohesion Fund is also of obvious significance, representing just over 
one-fifth of the Spanish Cohesion policy commitment appropriations. 
Figure 2: Commitment Appropriations under Structural Actions 2000-06 (€ millions, 
2004 prices) 
Heading Spain Heading as % 
Spanish total 
EU15 Spain as % of 
EU15 
Objective 1 41672.4 69.5 140817.8 29.6 
Objective 1 phase-out 388.6 0.6 9286.4 4.2 
Objective 2 2818.7 4.7 21786.8 12.9 
Objective 2 phase-out 108.2 0.2 3004.2 3.6 
Objective 3 2362.7 3.9 26553.1 8.9 
FIFG (ex Objective 1) 220.8 0.4 1221.1 18.1 
Cohesion Fund 12357.0 20.2 19717.0 62.7 
Total 59928.5 100.0 222386.5 26.9 
Source: EPRC calculations from data on Inforegio and RAPID release IP/99/442 
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In the years since the 2000-06 budget allocations were agreed, both Spain and the European 
Union have changed significantly. Not only has Spain been growing rapidly (impacting on 
both national and regional eligibility for Cohesion policy support) but the EU has expanded 
to 25 Member States. With all the new members poorer than Spain, setting traditional 
eligibility thresholds in terms of EU25 rather than EU15 averages significantly “raised the 
bar” for the EU15 Member States (the so-called “statistical effect”).9 The very different 
position of Spain in Cohesion policy eligibility terms is shown in Figure 3. There has been a 
major reduction in the proportion of the population located in regions qualifying for the 
highest level of Cohesion policy support (Objective 1 in 2000-06, the Convergence priority 
for 2007-13), down from 58.5 percent to 31.8 percent (Galicia, Castilla–la Mancha, 
Extremadura, Andalucía). Related, regions covered by transitional provisions have grown 
markedly in importance. The Phase-out regions, those impacted by the statistical effect 
(Asturias, Murcia, Ceuta and Melilla), account for almost 6 percent of the Spanish 
population for the 2007-13 period, while the Phase-in regions, those which no longer qualify 
as Convergence regions due to their growth, represent more than one-fifth of the national 
population (Castilla-León, Comunidad Valenciana and Canarias). Consequently, the funding 
accorded to such transitional regions was an obvious Spanish priority in the negotiations. 
Also important, given its current significance, was the fate of the Cohesion Fund in Spain. 
With GNI (PPS) per head of over 93 percent of the EU25 average (2001-03),10 Spain lost out 
on Cohesion Fund eligibility due to enlargement. Finally, funding for the Outermost regions 
remained a significant issue, the more so since, as already noted, Canarias did not meet the 
75 percent Convergence region eligibility threshold post 2006. 
                                                 
9 Setting the eligibility threshold for Convergence funding at 75 percent of the EU25 GDP (PPS) per 
head average is equivalent to an 82.2 percent threshold in EU15 terms. 
10 Compared to the 90 percent eligibility cut-off. 
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Figure 3: Objective 1/Convergence, Phase-Out and Phase-In Coverage (% of population) 
 2000-06 2007-13 
 Objective 1 Phase-out Convergence Phase-out Phase-in 
EU25  34.5 2.9 27.3 3.6 4.0 
EU15  22.4 3.5 14.5 4.3 4.1 
NMS10 96.7 0.0 92.9 0.0 3.8 
Belgium  12.7  12.4 0.0 
Czech Rep 88.6 0.0 88.6 0.0 0.0 
Denmark      
Germany  17.3 1.6 12.5 6.1  
Estonia 100  100.0   
Greece 100  36.6 55.5 7.8 
Spain 58.5 1.3 31.8 5.8 20.7 
France 2.7 1.9 2.9   
Ireland 26.6 73.4   26.5 
Italy 33.6 0.6 29.2 1.0 2.9 
Cyprus      
Latvia 100  100.0   
Lithuania 100  100.0   
Luxembourg      
Hungary 100.0  72.2  27.8 
Malta 100.0  100.0   
Netherlands  1.8    
Austria 3.4   3.4  
Poland 100.0  100.0   
Portugal 66.6 33.4 67.8 3.8 2.3 
Slovenia 100.0  100.0   
Slovak Rep 88.9  88.9   
Finland 21.0    13.0 
Sweden 11.0     
UK 8.6 3.5 4.0 0.6 4.4 
Source: EPRC calculations 
In summary, growth processes within Spain, combined with EU enlargement, meant that 
Spain was in a position where it was bound to lose a considerable level of Cohesion policy 
funding under the new Financial Perspective. This made it important for Spain to gain as 
much as possible from the budget negotiations to try to ensure that funding cutbacks 
remained within politically-acceptable bounds. In this context, it was significant that the 
budget agreement had to be unanimous; this ensured that Spanish sensitivities (and, 
indeed, the sensitivities of all Member States) had to be taken into account during the 
negotiations. On the other hand, it was in the interests of Spain that agreement on the 
budget should not be overly delayed; relative growth trends meant that Spain could have 
lost more Cohesion policy funding had the discussions continued into 2006 when a later 
dataset may have been used for allocation purposes. 
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2.3 The negotiation process and outcomes: the EU budget as a whole 
The process of negotiating the EU budget was lengthy. Initial Commission proposals 
regarding the next Financial Perspective (2007-13) were published in February 2004.11 The 
assumptions underpinning these proposals (and their implications) were then discussed and 
developed in the Friends of the Presidency Group on the Financial Perspectives which, in 
the course of the next year, considered almost 100 technical documents (fiches) produced 
by the Commission.12 A progress report in March 200513 summarised the work of the Group, 
the clarifications achieved and the developing positions on certain issues. Four days later, 
following the approach adopted in the run-up to the 1999 Berlin European Council, a first 
Negotiating Box was produced by the Luxembourg Presidency.14 This was “designed to 
provide a solid framework and give focus and momentum to the discussions”15 by 
distinguishing between areas (in normal typeface) where there was a degree of agreement 
(at least at the level of principles) and problem areas (in italics) which remained to be 
progressed. Four further Negotiating Boxes were considered in April, May and June.16 Areas 
of disagreement were narrowed and budgetary ranges became proposed figures. A final set 
of proposals was made in the last stages of the European Council on 17 June.17 However, 
the proposals did not receive the required unanimous approval of the Member States. Three 
of the main net contributors – the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands – rejected 
the package, as did, for different reasons, Finland and Spain. Spanish concerns centred 
particularly on the net balance position of the country.18 Two other Member States – 
Denmark and Italy – abstained. 
Although the failure to reach agreement led to considerable rancour in the immediate 
aftermath of the European Council, the Luxembourg Presidency felt that the basis for an 
agreement had been created.19 It argued that the final outcome would not be substantially 
different from the June Council proposal – “a budget for commitment appropriations 
representing 1.056% of national wealth and a budget for payment appropriations 
representing 1% of national wealth”. It placed the blame for non-agreement mainly at the 
door of the net contributors - and, in particular, the United Kingdom for failing to reduce 
its rebate sufficiently to allow the demands of all net contributors to be met. “Ah, if only 
                                                 
11 European Commission, Building our common future. Policy challenges and budgetary means of the 
enlarged Union 2007-2013, COM(2004) 101 final, 10 February 2004 
12 See the Temporary Committee on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 
2007-2013 at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/tempcom/finp/default_en.htm 
13 CADREFIN 35 of 4 March 2005 (6825/1/05 REV 1) 
14 CADREFIN 43 of 8 March 2005 (7054/05). 
15 Ibid, para 2. 
16 CADREFIN 84 of 21 April 2005 (8292/05), CADREFIN 108 of 19 May 2005 (9065/05), CADREFIN 115 of 
2 June 2005 (9637/05) and CADREFIN 130 of 15 June 2005 (10090/05) 
17 In the form of an addendum to CADREFIN 130 on 17 June 2005 (10090/05, ADD 1). 
18 For a more detailed discussion of the Spanish position on the Luxembourg presidency negotiations 
see: Navarro, A and Viguera, D (2005) ‘España y las perspectivas financieras de la UE’, Política 
Exterior, No.106, July/August 2005. 
19 Speech by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Council of the European Union, to the European 
Parliament, Brussels, 22 June 2005 
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those six, who together, on a day of inspiration wrote a letter, had agreed on the detail of 
their proposals!”20
With the future of the UK rebate at the heart of the disagreement, the United Kingdom 
Presidency delayed producing a further Negotiating Box until ten days before the December 
European Council.21 This left the results of the June negotiations unchanged as they related 
to the EU15, and tried to satisfy the net contributors by reducing the expenditure flowing 
to the new Member States by over 8 percent. By way of “compensation”, various 
concessions were made to the new Member States to ease their absorption of EU spending 
(by, for instance, increasing the co-financing rate from 80 percent to 85 percent, setting 
the automatic decommitment rule at n+3 rather than n+2 for 2007-10 and making housing 
projects eligible for ERDF support). As no doubt anticipated by the Presidency, the 
proposals were not accepted and, indeed, generated considerable adverse comment.22 
Further concessions were made in a second UK Negotiating Box to try to bring the parties 
closer to agreement.23 A final Negotiating Box was withheld until the Presidency felt that 
agreement could be reached.24 This made more concessions all round. Expenditure 
committed under the final set of proposals was 1.0459 percent of EU GNI compared to 1.03 
percent under the first UK Negotiating Box and 1.056 percent under the 17 June proposals 
of the Luxembourg Presidency. Also important to the final agreement were developments 
on the revenue side of the equation. The United Kingdom agreed to reduce the UK rebate 
by up to €10,500 million (an increase of €2,500 million compared to the second UK 
Negotiating Box) and additional concessions were made to Austria and, particularly, the 
Netherlands. 
An overview of the Financial Perspective at key stages of the negotiations is set out in 
Figure 4. Compared to the benchmark provided by 2006 expenditure commitments, the 
initial Commission proposal involved a much enhanced budget. An increase of almost a 
quarter was proposed in real terms, taking commitment appropriations close to the own 
resources ceiling for the budget. A key feature of the negotiations was the attempt by the 
net contributors to stabilise average expenditure levels at around prevailing levels, a 
maximum 1 percent of EU GNI. Early in the debate (December 2003), the Group of Six25 
made this proposal in the joint letter to the Commission President referred to above. 
                                                 
20 Ibid. The Group of Six letter is discussed further below. 
21 UK Presidency Website, European Union Financial Perspectives 2007-13, United Kingdom Presidency 
Negotiating Box available at http://www.eu2005.gov.uk, 5 December 2005. Although this may seem 
late in the day, it should be noted that the Luxembourg Presidency did not produce detailed figures 
until the Fourth Negotiating Box in early June. 
22 The spokesman for the Commission President (Johannes Laitenberger) commented: "You all know 
the old story of Robin Hood and the Sheriff of Nottingham. The President has made it very clear that 
he does not expect the British Presidency to take the role of the Sheriff of Nottingham, taking from 
the poor to give to the rich." Quoted on http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4488164.stm, 6 
December 2005 
23 UK Presidency Website, European Union Financial Perspectives 2007-13, United Kingdom Presidency 
Negotiating Box available at http://www.eu2005.gov.uk, 14 December 2005 
24 Finally published as CADREFIN 268 of 19 December 2005 (15915/05). 
25 Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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Thereafter, much of the debate concerned the appropriate level of expenditure, coupled 
with related arguments about the UK rebate, overall net balances and the need to review 
the future structure of the budget. While the final agreement set the budget for 
commitment appropriations above the 1 percent target of the Group of Six, payment 
appropriations were at this level while commitment appropriations in 2013 will be 1 
percent of EU GNI. 
Figure 4: Financial Perspective by Heading (€mn at 2004 prices) 
Heading 
2006 
bench-
mark 
As % 
EU 
total 
COM 
alloc’ns 
As % 
EU 
total 
Lux NB6 
alloc’ns 
As % 
EU 
total 
UK NB3 
alloc’ns 
As % 
EU 
total 
UK 
NB3 
as % 
COM 
UK 
NB3 
as % 
2006 
1  316764 38.2 463256 45.1 381604 43.8 379739 44.0 82.0 119.9 
1a  53662 6.5 121685 11.8 72010 8.3 72120 8.4 59.3 134.4 
1b 263102 31.8 341571 33.2 309594 35.5 307619 35.7 90.1 116.9 
2  388486 46.9 400679 39.0 377801 43.3 371244 43.0 92.7 95.6 
Of 
which: 
agric 306145 37.0 301074 29.3 295105 33.9 293105 34.0 97.4 95.7 
3 14049 1.7 20945 2.0 11000 1.3 10270 1.2 49.0 73.1 
4 53613 6.5 84649 8.2 50010 5.7 50010 5.8 59.1 93.3 
5 48013 5.8 57670 5.6 50300 5.8 50300 5.8 87.2 104.8 
Comp 7287 0.9 800 0.1 800 0.1 800 0.1 100.0 11.0 
Total  828212 100.0 1027999 100.0 871515 100.0 862363 100.0 83.9 104.1 
GNI 75121480  82448058  82448058  82448058    
% GNI 1.10  1.25  1.06  1.0459    
Sources: The Commission allocations and related 2006 data are drawn from Fiche 29 Rev1, 
as updated to take account of the latest available data, Fiche 17 and Fiche 92. The 2006 
benchmark figures consist of 2006 commitment appropriations multiplied by 7. The 
Luxembourg Presidency figures come from CADREFIN 130 of 15 June 2005 (10090/05), as 
amended and the UK Presidency data from CADREFIN 268 of 19 December 2005 (15915/05) 
Although the overall budget was much reduced compared to the original Commission 
proposal, the key expenditure headings for the net recipients held up well during the 
negotiations. The final Cohesion policy budget (Heading 1b) was cut by less than 10 percent 
compared to the overall fall in commitment appropriations of more than 16 percent. The 
allocations to headings of less direct benefit to net recipients - Headings 1a 
(Competitiveness), 3 (Internal policies) and 4 (EU as a global partner) - were reduced by 
between two-fifths and a half. Of the other headings, administration (Heading 5) was cut by 
almost 13 percent while spending on natural resources (Heading 2) fell by just over 7 
percent. The agricultural component of Heading 2 was largely unchanged in line with the 
agreement reached at the October 2002 European Council; the decline recorded reflected 
the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania within the October 2002 ceilings. 
Another way of viewing the outcomes of the negotiations is to compare the final agreement 
with commitment allocations in 2006 (see the last column in Figure 4). This shows the most 
significant increases to have been under Heading 1a (Competitiveness), which grew by one-
third in real terms (albeit from a low base), and Heading 1b which increased by one-sixth. 
In contrast, agricultural spending was cut by more than 4 percent in real terms. The 
relative changes experienced by the different budget headings during the negotiations are 
set out in Figure 5. Perhaps the most interesting feature is that, at each stage, the 
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proportion of the budget devoted to Cohesion policy increased. This is clearly in line with 
Spanish interests. 
Figure 5: Commitment Allocations as a percent of the EU Total 
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Although the agreed budget was lower than the Spanish authorities wished, its structure 
met many of the negotiating goals of Spain – in particular, the relative importance attached 
to Headings 1b (Cohesion policy) and 2 (Natural resources) which, together, account for 
almost 90 percent of commitment appropriations. In addition, the allocation of extra 
resources to Heading 3a (freedom security and justice) to finance the management of EU 
immigration - a proposal driven by the Spanish Prime Minister at the Hampton European 
Council meeting - is also expected to be of particular benefit to Spain given its close 
proximity to Africa and the acute immigration challenges faced over recent years. While 
the Competitiveness heading (1a) grew in significance relative to the 2006 benchmark 
position, it was much reduced from the original Commission proposal. Moreover, in line 
with Spain’s negotiating goals, “ensuring balanced access for all Member States” was 
included in the allocation criteria for the EU’s research efforts alongside “excellence”.26  
2.4 The negotiation process and outcomes: Cohesion policy  
With respect to Cohesion policy, a number of key issues had to be resolved in the course of 
the negotiations: the allocation of funding between the Convergence priority, the Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment priority and the Territorial Cooperation priority; related, 
the split between the new Member States and the EU15 (as determined primarily by the 
level of absorption capping applied to the new Member States and the assumed future 
growth rates for these countries); the transitional provisions for regions losing their 
previous designated status (the Phase-out regions under the Convergence priority and the 
                                                 
26 CADREFIN 268 of 19 December 2005 (15915/05), para 10. 
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Phase-in regions under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment priority); provisions 
relating to the Cohesion Fund (in particular, from a Spanish perspective, whether 
transitional provisions should apply to countries losing Cohesion Fund eligibility); and the 
treatment of special geographic areas under the Treaty – specifically, the Outermost 
regions (Canarias in the Spanish context) and regions of sparse population (in the Nordic 
Member States).  
An overview of Cohesion policy commitment appropriations at different stages of the 
budget negotiations is provided in Figure 6.  
Figure 6: Cohesion Policy Commitment Appropriations 2007-13 (€mn at 2004 prices) 
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It can be seen that the overall Cohesion policy budget initially fell significantly from the 
Commission proposal (while remaining well above 2006 benchmark levels – see Figure 4). It 
recovered a little in the final phase of the Luxembourg Presidency, was cut again in the 
first UK Negotiating Box and then rose once more as special provisions were introduced in 
response to country demands in the last stage of the negotiations. In global terms, there 
was relatively little difference between Cohesion policy funding under the fourth 
Luxembourg Negotiating Box (€306,508 million) and the final agreement (€307,619 million). 
At this level, the budget was broadly midway between the 2006 benchmark figure (around 
€263,000 million) and the original Commission proposal (over €341,000 million). 
Figure 6 shows a similar pattern for most components of the Cohesion budget. However, a 
number of differential points emerge. First, while the Convergence priority (containing just 
under one-third of the Spanish population) suffered by far the lowest percentage fall 
compared to the original Commission proposal (just over 7 percent), it was the Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment priority (13.6 percent decline) which gained funding at 
virtually every subsequent stage of the negotiations; some two-fifths of the Spanish 
population live in regions covered by this priority. In contrast, the Territorial Cooperation 
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budget almost halved in the course of the negotiations (to €7,500 million). Under this 
priority, by far the greatest stress came to be placed on cross-border cooperation. Second, 
funding for transitional regions proved to be relatively robust during the negotiations – 
especially the budget for the Phase-in regions which rose from €8,103 million in the initial 
Commission proposal to €10,385 million. No other component of the Cohesion policy budget 
increased beyond the original Commission proposal. As mentioned earlier, more than one-
fifth of the Spanish population is located in this category of region (see Figure 3). Finally, 
Figure 6 shows that the Cohesion Fund held up well during the negotiations. This was at 
least in part due to the special transitional provisions gained by Spain. 
In short, Spain benefited from many of the key developments during the negotiations. This 
is underscored in the sections which follow, where each of the main negotiation issues from 
a Cohesion policy perspective are considered briefly in turn. A final section (Section 2.5) 
draws together the important points to emerge from the viewpoint of Spain. 
2.4.1 Negotiation issues: allocations by priority 
A basic negotiation issue concerned the budgetary split between the Convergence, Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment, and Territorial Cooperation priorities. As shown in Figure 
7, compared to the allocations proposed in the Third Cohesion Report in February 2004,27 
there was, initially, a significant shift away from the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment heading and towards the Convergence priority. Then, as the negotiations 
became more intense, it was the Territorial Cooperation priority which was squeezed as 
countries impacted by the proposed Regional Competitiveness and Employment cutbacks 
sought to restore their position. Of particular note, a “safety net” was introduced such that 
each Member State’s share of the Regional Competitiveness and Employment budget could 
not be less than three quarters of its 2006 share of combined Objective 2 and 3 funding.  
Figure 7: Changes in the Percentage Split between Convergence Priorities 
 Convergence Regional Competitiveness 
and Employment 
Territorial 
Cooperation 
Third Cohesion Report 
(Feb 2004) 
78.0 18.0 4.0 
Updated COM proposal 
(Fiche 26REV4, 26.4.05) 
79.3 16.5 4.2 
NB2 81.0 15.0 4.0 
NB3 82.0 15.0 3.0 
NB4 82.0 15.0 3.0 
NB5 82.3 15.25 2.45 
NB6 82.3 15.28 2.42 
UKNB1 81.6 15.9 2.5 
UKNB2 81.6 15.9 2.5 
UKNB3 81.7 15.8 2.4 
 
                                                 
27 European Commission, A New Partnership for Cohesion: convergence, competitiveness, 
cooperation, Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, February 2004, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion3/cohesion3_
en.htm
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2.4.2 Negotiation issues: the absorption cap on new Member States 
A related issue concerned the division of the Cohesion policy budget between the EU15 and 
the new Member States. Under the allocation methodology, it was the so-called Berlin 
method (as amended) which was the basis for the distribution of resources to the EU15. In 
contrast, for the new Member States, it was what became known as the absorption cap 
which mainly determined the resources they received. The absorption cap was originally 
introduced under the argument that there was a level (4 percent of GNI) beyond which it 
was difficult for Member States to absorb (ie effectively utilise) EU resources. The impact 
of the absorption cap on individual Member States varies since this is dependent on 
assumed future growth rates by country. However, at a more general level, the main 
developments are clear. As early as the first Negotiating Box, a side effect of capping was 
highlighted: the fact that it resulted in lower aid intensities per head for poorer Member 
States (contrary to the philosophy underpinning the allocation methodology). To counter 
this, reduced capping levels were introduced which were lower the more prosperous the 
Member State. Changes in these effective levels of capping are set out in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Changes in Effective Levels of Capping (as a percent of national GDP) 
 Country groups (as % EU25 GNI) 
 <40  40-45  45-50  50-55  55-60 60-65 65-70 70-75 + 5% pts 
NB2 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 -0.1 %pt 
NB3 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 -0.1 %pt 
NB4 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 -0.1 %pt 
NB5 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 -0.1 %pt 
NB6 4.0 3.92 3.92 3.82 3.72 3.62 3.52 3.42 -0.1 %pt 
UKNB1 3.663 3.590 3.590 3.498 3.407 3.315 3.223 3.132 -0.09 %pt 
UKNB2 3.663 3.590 3.590 3.498 3.407 3.315 3.223 3.132 -0.09 %pt 
UKNB3 3.7893 3.7153 3.7153 3.6188 3.5240 3.4293 3.3346 3.2398 -0.09 %pt 
 
Apart from an adjustment between the second and third Negotiating Boxes which benefited 
all but the poorest new Member States (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania), the capping 
percentages remained unchanged until the final Luxembourg Negotiating Box (NB6), which 
saw a further (minor) increase. As already noted, the UK Presidency had to reduce overall 
expenditure (to create budgetary space to satisfy the net contributors) whilst trying to 
avoid unravelling the progress made under the Luxembourg Presidency. It chose to leave 
EU15 allocations unchanged while cutting back on new Member State receipts via an 8.4 
percent reduction in effective capping levels (see Figure 8). By way of compensation, and 
as mentioned earlier, a series of changes were made to ease the absorption of Cohesion 
policy funding in the new Member States: co-financing rates were increased from 80 to 85 
percent, the automatic n+2 decommitment rule became n+3 for 2007 until 2010, and 
housing projects became eligible for ERDF support. However, these “off-budget” 
concessions were not sufficient to satisfy the new Member States. Accordingly, the second 
UK Negotiating Box not only introduced a further easing of regulatory provisions,28 but also 
made specific additional Cohesion policy provision for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia and Latvia, while Slovakia and Lithuania received extra funding towards nuclear 
                                                 
28 By allowing poorer Member States to count non-reimbursable VAT as eligible expenditure when 
calculating Member State contributions  
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decommissioning costs.29 Finally, in the last UK Negotiating Box, effective capping levels 
were increased by 3.4 percent, reducing the capping-related cutback to just over 5 percent 
of the final Luxembourg Presidency proposal (see Figure 8). In addition, to achieve the 
agreement of all the new Member States, further additional support was provided to Poland 
(including a transfer of €100 million from Germany). 
2.4.3 Negotiation issues: regions in transition 
Another important topic in the negotiations related to the treatment of so-called 
transitional regions – those areas losing their former designated status. The question was 
raised as early as the first Negotiating Box as to whether the proposed arrangements for 
transitional regions (Phase-out and Phase-in) “constitute an adequate response to the issue 
of transition”.30 This issue was taken forward in the second Negotiating Box, with 
significant extra provision being made for those Member States (Greece and Germany) 
where at least one third of the national population was located in Phase-out regions. In the 
same Negotiating Box, Spain benefited directly from the decision to provide transitional 
support for countries losing their Cohesion Fund status due to the statistical effect 
(discussed further below). Over subsequent Negotiating Boxes, the allocations to Phase-out 
and Phase-in regions were refined and were made explicit from the fifth Luxembourg 
Negotiating Box onwards (see Figure 9). The increases recorded in these later stages of the 
negotiations mainly reflect additional provisions made to Member States outside the 
standard allocation formulae. Thus, for instance, in the final UK Negotiating Box, additional 
funding of €1,400 million was made available to Italy (of which €111 million related to 
Phase-out regions and €251 million to Phase-in regions), €2,000 million to Spain (of which 
€75 million was indicatively allocated to Phase-out and €75 million to Phase-in) and €225 
million to Germany (of which €58 million was Phase-out support). These three countries 
thus accounted for all but €75 million of the additional Phase-out support recorded in 
Figure 9.31
Figure 9: Changes in Phase-Out and Phase-In Funding 
 Phase-Out 
(€mn) 
Phase-Out 
(% Convergence 
funding) 
Phase-In 
(€mn) 
Phase-In  
(% Regional 
Comp/Empl funding) 
NB5 12,202 4.84 9,494 20.30 
NB6 12,202 4.79 9,695 20.49 
UKNB1 12.200 5.04 9,500 20.13 
UKNB2 12,202 5.00 9,688 20.39 
UKNB3 12,521 4.98 10,385 21.29 
Note: The figures in the first UK Negotiating Box (UKNB1) were in billions to one decimal 
point 
                                                 
29 Cyprus and Malta also benefited from specific features of the allocation methodology (see para 47 
and para 32(1) of the final Negotiating Box). Only Slovenia was left out. However, Slovenia was 
anyway inclined to accept the proposals since it would have suffered significantly had agreement 
been delayed and a later dataset been used. 
30 CADREFIN 43 of 8 March 2005, para 33. 
31 Of the remaining €75 million, €50 million probably relates to additional funding for Ceuta and 
Melilla, though this was gained under the second UK Negotiating Box. 
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2.4.4 Negotiation issues: Cohesion Fund transitional provisions  
As already mentioned, Spain benefited significantly (and exclusively) from the special 
transitional provisions agreed to help countries “phase-out” from the Cohesion Fund. There 
was no precedent for such an approach; Ireland lost Cohesion Fund status at the end of 
2003 without any phase-out period. On the other hand, the introduction of transitional 
provisions took cognisance of the fact that the Spanish loss of eligibility was not due to 
growth per se but rather was attributable to the statistical effects of enlargement.  
The proposal that there should be transitional provisions for the Cohesion Fund was 
introduced as early as the second Negotiating Box. By the fifth Negotiating Box, the 
proposal was for a two-year transition, involving funding for Spain of €2,000 million, €1,200 
million in 2007 and €800 million in 2008. However, in the final hours of the Luxembourg 
Presidency, this was pushed up to €2,800 million, spread over four years. The UK Presidency 
saw a further €450 million allocated. This took the total transitional allocation to €3,250 
million, covering the full 2007-13 period: €1,200 million in 2007; €850 million in 2008; €500 
million in 2009; €250 million in 2010; €200 million in 2011; €150 million in 2012; and €100 
million in 2013. This was a very significant allocation, representing around 10 percent of 
the final Cohesion policy budget for Spain. 
2.4.5 Negotiation issues: regions with specific characteristics 
There were two other aspects of the Cohesion policy negotiations which were of particular 
interest to Spain. One concerned the treatment of the Outermost regions (in the Spanish 
context, Canarias). As “regions with specific characteristics recognised under the 
Treaties”,32 the Outermost regions were grouped together for negotiation purposes with 
the sparsely-populated areas of Finland and Sweden. It was under the third Negotiating Box 
that specific additional provision was first made for such regions. The initial proposal was 
that additional funding should be provided to the value of €20 per inhabitant per year – 
worth €248.7 million to Canarias over the 2007-13 period. The rate of provision was 
subsequently raised to €30 per inhabitant per year in the fifth Negotiating Box (worth 
€374.5 million)33 and €35 per inhabitant per year in the sixth Negotiating Box (€436.9 
million).34 Canarias also benefited from further additional provision (€100 million) under 
the final Negotiating Box of the Luxembourg Presidency. In total, the extra €536.9 million 
awarded represented an increase of almost three-quarters in the Regional Competitiveness 
allocation to Canarias; however, this leaves per capita aid levels for Canarias at only a little 
over half Convergence region levels. 
2.4.6 Negotiation issues: additional provisions 
The last Cohesion policy element of the negotiations involved a series of so-called 
“additional provisions”. These were introduced because the general nature of the 
                                                 
32 CADREFIN 108 of 19 May 2005, paras 32 and 33 
33 CADREFIN 130 of 15 June 2005, para 44 
34 Addendum to CADREFIN 130 of 17 June 2005, para 44 
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allocation methodology did “not allow an adequate response to a number of objective 
situations”,35 thus leading to the special treatment of certain regions and countries. Such 
provisions were part of the process of trying to ensure that all Member States were in a 
position to sign up to the negotiated agreement. They first appeared as a separate heading 
in the fifth Luxembourg Negotiating Box, increased by over €520 million in the final June 
Negotiating Box and rose significantly in both the second and third UK Negotiating Boxes (by 
€1,350 million and €4,077 million respectively - see Figure 10). From the fifth Luxembourg 
Negotiating Box to the final UK proposal, they grew by over €7,000 million as the respective 
Presidencies strove to achieve an agreed solution. 
In discussing the additional provisions, it should be noted that there is a degree of 
arbitrariness surrounding whether particular “additions” are classified as being distinct 
from the general allocation mechanism. Thus, for instance, the transitional provisions 
relating to the Cohesion Fund (which, as has been noted, were not part of the traditional 
allocation mechanism and are of specific benefit to Spain) are not incorporated within the 
“additional provisions” heading. On the other hand, a number of other transition-related 
adjustments are included: the enhanced treatment accorded to Member States with at 
least one-third of their population in Phase-out regions (para 44);36 the treatment of 
regions which qualify for transitional support but which were not eligible for 2000-06 
Objective 1 funding (para 45); the treatment of Cyprus, which was not an Objective 1 
region from 2004-06 but which would have been had revised data been used (para 47); and 
the treatment of Itä-Suomi and Madeira as if they were Phase-out regions when they have 
Phase-in status (para 48). In similar vein, the provision to increase funding under the 
Territorial Cooperation priority by 50 percent for regions formerly on external borders 
(EU15/EU12) or on EU25/EU2 borders (para 51) covers a number of countries and could 
equally be viewed as part of the allocation method for the Territorial Cooperation priority. 
Focusing on those additional provisions which can be readily quantified (see Figure 10), it 
can be seen that Spain benefited significantly. As already discussed, there was additional 
funding for Canarias of €100 million (under para 49); the already-mentioned provision for 
the Outermost regions, worth €436.9 million to Canarias (para 50); the previously-noted 
additional allocation of €2,000 million under the ERDF to enhance Spanish R&D provision 
(para 54 bis); and a further €50 million for Ceuta and Melilla (para 54 ter). These additions 
total €2,586.9 million, more than 36 percent of the total quantified additional provisions 
(€7,006.9 million). Having said that, there were other country-specific additions from which 
Spain did not benefit – including €4,070 million under the rural development heading and 
€755 million (plus reduced rates of VAT call) on the revenue side of the budget. Even so, 
once such additional allocations are taken into account, Spain still did well in terms of 
those additional provisions which can be quantified, receiving more than one-fifth of the 
country-specific additions. In addition, the transitional provisions relating to the Cohesion 
Fund were clearly of major benefit to Spain. 
                                                 
35 CADREFIN 268 of 19 December 2005, para 43 
36 In practice, Germany and Greece 
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Figure 10: Changing Value of Additional Provisions between NB5 and UKNB3 (€mn) 
UKNB3 
 para 
Beneficiary NB5 NB6 UKNB1 UKNB2 UKNB3 
44 Germany n.a.     
44 Greece n.a.     
45 Transitional areas n.a.     
46 Poland 114.2 114.2 114.2 1084.7 1221.7 
46 bis Hungary    n.a. 140.0 
46 ter Czech Republic    200.0 200.0 
47 Cyprus n.a.     
48 Finland n.a.     
48 Portugal n.a.     
49 Spain  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
50 Spain 374.5 436.9 436.9 436.9 436.9 
50 Finland 164.4 191.8 191.8 191.8 191.8 
50 Sweden 203.2 237.1 237.1 237.1 237.1 
51 Border regions n.a.     
52 Ireland 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
52 UK 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
53 Sweden  150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 
53 bis Estonia    47.6 47.6 
53 bis Latvia    81.9 81.9 
54 Austria  150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 
54 Germany     75.0 
54 bis Spain     2000.0 
54 ter Spain    50.0 50.0 
54 quarter Italy     1400.0 
54 quinto France     100.0 
54 sexto Germany     225.0 
Total Total 1056.2 1579.9 1579.9 2929.9 7006.9 
Total Spain 374.5 536.9 536.9 586.9 2586.9 
Increase Total 1056.2 523.7 0.0 1350.0 4077.1 
Increase Spain 374.5 162.4 0.0 50.0 2000.0 
Notes: The focus is on the changes introduced between the fifth Luxembourg Negotiating 
Box and the third UK Negotiating Box. For those entries where the value of the concession 
is not made explicit in the Negotiating Box (n.a. in the table), there was no subsequent 
change to the value of the concession (except under para 46 bis). It should be noted that 
the above table does not list all of the concessions made in the final stages of the 
negotiations. There were also rural development “add-ons” (under para 63), which totalled 
€4,070 million, and own resources “add-ons” (under para 78) which, in addition to reduced 
VAT calls, benefited the Netherlands to the tune of €605 million and Sweden to the value of 
€150 million.  
2.5 Implications for Spain 
The basic conclusion arising from the above review must be that, set alongside its original 
negotiating goals (see Section 2.1), the outcome of the Cohesion policy budget negotiations 
was positive for Spain. It certainly managed to meet many of its objectives. Above all, 
Spain achieved very significant transitional support (€3,250 million) following the loss of 
eligibility for the Cohesion Fund, with the negotiated transitional phase extending over the 
entire 2007-13 period. In addition, while it did not meet its goal of Phase-out regions being 
treated similarly to Convergence regions,37 it did achieve a significant increase in the 
Phase-in budget, taking it well above the original Commission proposal. More than one-fifth 
of the Spanish population fits within the Phase-in category.38 Spain also managed to ensure 
                                                 
37 Specific extra provision was limited to countries where Phase-out regions made up more than one 
third of the national population (compared to just 6 percent in Spain). On the other hand, it is of note 
that this concession was made at the same time as transitional Cohesion Fund support was made 
available to Spain. 
38 On the other hand, it could not achieve Phase-in status for Cantabria given its growth performance. 
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that the Regional Competitiveness and Employment priority was retained at a reasonable 
level of funding in the face of the negotiating stance of some countries that resources 
should focus exclusively on poor countries and/or regions. With regard to Canarias, extra 
support worth €536.9 million was won. Spain also gained specific extra provision for Ceuta 
and Melilla (€50 million). Finally, not only did Spain mange to ensure that there was at least 
an element of “balanced access” to Competitiveness funding (under EU budget heading 1a), 
but it also gained major Cohesion policy support for Spanish R&D (€2,000 million). 
On the other hand, it is clear that the overall Cohesion policy budget flowing to Spain will 
be much reduced from 2000-06 levels. The next section considers future Spanish Cohesion 
policy funding in more detail, comparing it in particular to current allocations. 
3. COHESION POLICY – NATIONAL AND REGIONAL OUTCOMES 
As already discussed, the financial implications for Spain of the reform of Cohesion policy 
post-2006 flow from two main factors: first, changes in eligibility for Cohesion policy 
support, which are partly, but not entirely, due to enlargement and shifting EU averages; 
and second, changes in the overall budget allocation and the architecture of the reform. 
This section begins by looking at the national level implications of Cohesion policy reform 
before considering the implications for the regional level in those areas of policy where 
financial allocations are disaggregated. In both cases, it compares the outcome of the 1999 
Berlin European Council with the third UK Negotiating Box (UKNB3) and, at the national 
level, with the Commission proposals (COM prop). 
3.1 Overall Cohesion policy allocations 
As noted earlier (see Figure 2), Spain was the single largest beneficiary of the structural 
actions budget in the 2000-06 Cohesion policy planning period, accounting for almost 27 
percent of total commitment appropriations. The different architecture proposed for 
Cohesion policy in 2007-13 complicates direct comparisons with 2000-06. However, setting 
the new structure aside and grouping spending in various categories, a clear picture of the 
significance for Spain of the new proposals can be obtained. This is illustrated in Figure 11 
which covers just the EU15 Member States. For Spain, it can be seen that there is a sharp 
decline in commitment appropriations in each category of expenditure. On the other hand, 
and as already discussed, in the course of the negotiations, Spain managed to maintain (and 
indeed increase) its overall level of funding (compared to the original Commission proposal) 
– and this despite significant cutbacks in funding flows to the EU15 as a whole. 
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Figure 11: Impact of COM Proposals and UKNB3 on Commitment Appropriations for Spain 
(€m, 2004 prices) 
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Notes: (i) For the 2000-06 period, spending has been grouped as follows: Objective 1 
includes Objective 1 Phase-out; Objective 2 includes Objective 2 Phase-out, Objective 3 
and FIFG outside Objective 1 (see Figure 2); (ii) For the 2007-13 proposals, Objective 1 
includes Phase-out, Phase-in and OMRs (Outermost regions); (iii) Community Initiatives 
(2000-06) and the Cooperation priority (2007-13) are excluded from these figures. 
Source: EPRC calculations from Eurostat data, data on Inforegio and RAPID release 
IP/99/442 
Figure 12: Spanish Share of Cohesion Commitment Appropriations (% of EU15 total) 
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Figure 11 shows that the proposed allocation to Spain fell significantly in absolute terms – 
from around €60 billion (2004 prices) in 2000-06 to under €30 billion under the Commission 
proposal (but over €30 billion under UKNB3). It also fell in relative terms. Expressed as a 
proportion of the EU15 commitment allocations, Spain will receive a significant reduction in 
its share of overall EU15 funding compared to the 2000-06 period (see Figure 12). Against 
this, it can be seen that, in the course of the negotiations, Spain managed to increase its 
funding share to more than one-fifth of the EU15 total. 
3.2 Objective 1 / Convergence 
As discussed in the context of Figure 3, one of the main reasons for the scale of the impact 
on Spanish commitment appropriations concerns changes in the eligibility of the Spanish 
regions for Convergence support, due both to enlargement and the growth of the Spanish 
economy. Less than one-third of the Spanish population is now located in regions qualifying 
for full Convergence status, compared to almost three-fifths for the 2000-06 period. 
Related, transitional status has become important for Spain, with almost 6 percent of the 
population in Phase-out regions and over one-fifth in Phase-in regions. Because of the 
changes in eligibility and the impact of enlargement, comparisons between the 2000-06 
period and the outcomes under UKNB3 for 2007-13 are not straightforward. Nevertheless, it 
is clear that, within the EU15, the new proposals (both COM prop and UKNB3) involve a 
significant reduction in Convergence funding. The Spanish share in total EU15 Convergence 
funding is estimated to fall from over 29 percent in 2000-06 to around 24 percent under 
UKNB3 (see Figure 13).  
Figure 13: Implications for EU15 Convergence Region Total Allocations (€m, 2004 
prices) 
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The reforms introduced in respect of EU Cohesion policy also imply a decline in aid to 
Convergence regions measured in per capita terms (see Figure 14). This reduction is much 
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less marked than that in the overall budget allocations. Spain continues to receive a higher 
per capita allocation than the EU15 average. 
Figure 14: Implications for Convergence Regions - Per Capita Annual Allocations (€, 
2004 prices) 
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3.3 Cohesion Fund 
Another key element from the Spanish perspective concerns eligibility for the Cohesion 
Fund. The Cohesion Fund contributes to the Convergence priority under the new 
architecture. Eligibility for the Cohesion Fund is defined in Article 5(3) of the draft 
Regulation as concerning Member States whose per capita Gross National Income (GNI), 
measured in purchasing power parities and calculated for the last three years available, is 
less than 90 percent of the Community average, and which have a programme for meeting 
the economic convergence conditions referred to in Article 104. 
Figure 15: GNI (PPS) Per Head 2001-03 (EU25=100) 
Eligible Member States Ineligible Member States 
Latvia 38.6 Spain 93.3 
Estonia 41.5 Italy 107.8 
Lithuania 42.9 Germany 109.2 
Poland 45.7 Ireland 110.5 
Slovakia 50.9 Finland 112.0 
Hungary 55.6 Sweden 115.1 
Czech Republic 65.1 France 115.5 
Malta 71.2 Belgium 119.5 
Portugal 75.2 United Kingdom 119.6 
Slovenia 76.1 Netherlands 120.2 
Greece 77.3 Austria 120.8 
Cyprus 85.4 Denmark 122.7 
  Luxembourg 190.9 
Source: EPRC calculations from DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
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The current recipients of the Cohesion Fund are Greece, Portugal and Spain, together with 
all of the new Member States (with effect from 2004). Ireland ceased to be eligible at the 
end of 2003 following the mid-term review. Using GNI data for 2001-03, Figure 15 lists the 
GNI per head figures for Member States relative to the EU25 average. The table makes clear 
that all of new Member States, plus Greece and Portugal, would qualify for the Cohesion 
Fund post-2006, but that Spain would cease to be eligible. 
As discussed earlier, the initial Commission proposal did not include any transitional 
arrangements for the Cohesion Fund. This was a key element in the Spanish position on the 
reforms and, as discussed in the last section, ultimately resulted in special phase-out 
provisions being made for Spain. The implications for Spain of the reform proposals for the 
Cohesion Fund are illustrated in Figure 16. This shows a dramatic shift in the Spanish 
situation: from having been the main beneficiary in 2000-06, no allocation was initially 
proposed by the Commission. Transitional arrangements were sought and, as already 
discussed, resulted in funding of €3.25 billion (compared with over €12.3 billion in 2000-
06). 
Figure 16: Implications for Cohesion Fund Total Allocations (€m, 2004 prices) 
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3.4 Outermost regions 
Reflecting the changes to the Treaty regarding the Outermost regions (OMRs), the draft 
Structural Funds Regulation provides for a special budget line for the seven regions 
concerned; there was no such special treatment in the 2000-06 period. In the Spanish 
context only Canarias is designated as an Outermost region.  
The allocation for the Outermost regions was around €1100 million for 2007-13 under the 
Commission proposal, of which about €493 million was for Spain. During the negotiations, 
these allocations fell to around €983 million and €437 million respectively. In addition, 
however, a sum of €100 million was allocated specifically to Canarias, although the budget 
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line was not specified. Taking the OMR and the Phase-in allocations together, the allocation 
for Canarias is about 50 percent more in per head terms as for the other Phase-in regions 
(Castilla-León and Valencia). 
3.5 Regional Competitiveness and Employment 
The Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective contains two strands: Phase-in 
regions (former Objective 1 regions now above the 75 percent threshold even without the 
statistical effect); and Regional Competitiveness and Employment regions (all regions not 
classified under the Convergence, Phase-out and Phase-in headings). For 2000-06, Objective 
2 is targeted at areas of industrial, rural or urban change. Objective 3 is not strictly a 
spatial objective, but rather channels European Social Fund (ESF) monies to all regions not 
covered by Objective 1 (in Objective 1 areas, ESF monies are incorporated into the overall 
programmes). By contrast, for 2007-13, it is proposed to abandon spatial targeting of the 
Objective 2 type in favour of a more thematic, all-region approach. In looking at 2007-13, a 
key point is that Spain is the single largest beneficiary of Phase-in status, accounting for 
over 45 percent of the EU population falling into this category (see Figure 17).  
Figure 17: Objective 2/3 and Competitiveness & Employment Coverage (% of population) 
 2000-6 2007-13 
 Objective 2 Objective 3 Phase-in Competitiveness & 
Employment 
EU25 15 62.6 4.0 65.1 
EU15 18 74.1 4.1 77.1 
NMS10 0.9 3.3 3.8 3.3 
Belgium 12 87.3  87.6 
Czech Rep 3.5 11.4  11.4 
Denmark 10 100  100 
Germany 13 81.1  81.4 
Estonia     
Greece   7.8 0.1 
Spain 22 40.2 20.7 41.7 
France 31 95.4  97.1 
Ireland   26.5 73.5 
Italy 13 65.8 2.9 66.9 
Cyprus 30 100  100 
Latvia     
Lithuania     
Luxembourg 23 100  100 
Hungary   27.8  
Malta     
Netherlands 15 98.2  100 
Austria 25 96.6  96.6 
Poland     
Portugal   2.3 26.1 
Slovenia     
Slovak Rep 3.3 11.1  11.1 
Finland 31 79 13.0 87 
Sweden 14 89  100 
UK 24 87.9 4.4 91 
Note: Objective 3 covers all areas, except those covered by Objective 1. 
Source: Inforegio; EPRC calculations from Eurostat data. 
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However, it is not strictly relevant to compare Phase-in funding with past Objective 2 and 3 
funding since, as discussed earlier, the areas concerned are transitional areas previously 
covered by Objective 1. 
In 2000-06, Objective 2 regions were selected by the Member States in cooperation with the 
European Commission, subject to a national quota – in the Spanish case around 22 percent 
of the population (8.8 million inhabitants). Regarding Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment regions, the key difference for the 2007-13 period is that assistance will not be 
limited to designated areas but, instead, will be allocated on a thematic basis. In effect, 
this means that the eligible areas will rise from 22 percent of the population under 
Objective 2 to 41.7 percent under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment 
Objective. Clearly this complicates any attempts to compare allocations between the two 
periods. Nevertheless, combining Objective 2 and 3 funding for 2000-06 and comparing this 
with 2007-13 shows a clear decline in funding in the course of the negotiations (see Figure 
18). EPRC calculations suggest that Spain’s share of EU15 Objective 2/3 funding would fall 
from around 10.5 percent in 2000-06 to around 8 percent in 2007-13 (slightly above the 
Spanish share under the Commission proposal - 7 percent); this reflects the effective 
extension of eligibility for Regional Competitiveness and Employment funding to all areas 
not classed as Convergence, Phase-out or Phase-in regions. 
Figure 18: Objective 2/3 and Competitiveness & Employment Funding (€m, 2004 prices) 
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Partly because of this extension in coverage, changes in aid intensity are difficult to 
compare between the funding periods; in practice, the allocation to any given area will 
depend on decisions about thematic and/or spatial priorities. However, an overall measure 
of the impact of change – and the potential dilution of funding - can be drawn by taking 
account of Objective 2 and 3 allocations in Objective 2 areas (ie. setting aside Objective 3 
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allocations made to non-assisted areas) and comparing these with the Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment allocations. This is done in Figure 19. 
Figure 19: Aid per head per annum under Objective 2 and the Regional Competitiveness 
& Employment Objective (€, 2004 prices) 
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Note: The 2000-06 figure includes Objective 3 allocations to Objective 2 regions, but not 
those made elsewhere.  
3.6 Regional-level implications of Cohesion policy reform 
Turning to the sub-national level, the overall fall in Convergence allocations to Spain is 
closely related to the changing eligibility of the Spanish regions for Cohesion policy support. 
As can be seen from Figure 20, only four of the current 12 Objective 1 regions (Galicia, 
Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura and Andalucía) will retain Convergence region status. Of 
the other current full Objective 1 regions, four are due to be classified as Phase-out regions 
(Asturias, Región de Murcia, Ceuta and Melilla) and two as Phase-in regions (Castilla-León 
and Valencia) while, despite being a Phase-in region, Canarias will receive significant extra 
funding due to its Outermost region status. 
It is not possible to determine the ultimate impact of the above changes in eligibility and 
allocations on the funding provision for individual regions. The main reason for this is that 
there is not a direct relationship between the Berlin funding methodology and levels of 
support distributed to the regions, notwithstanding the fact that the Berlin methodology for 
the allocation of Objective 1 support is determined ‘bottom up’ on the basis of NUTS II 
disparities in GDP per head and unemployment rates. The lack of a direct relationship 
partly reflects the operation of multi-regional programmes and partly national government 
decisions on the distribution of funds. These arrangements are defended by the central 
government on the grounds that the internal distribution of funding is largely a Member 
State responsibility (the Commission’s allocations are only “indicative”) and also because it 
has important competencies in policy areas within the remit of Cohesion policy. Moreover, 
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as the Structural Funds represent only one of the instruments within the overall 
architecture of central government investment activity in the regions (others include the 
Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund, domestic regionalised or non-regionalised sectoral 
investments, and investment from other public sector agencies/bodies), the national view 
is that it is the aggregate “policy-mix” that should guide decisions over redistributive 
outcomes rather than a strict adherence to EU funding formulae under a single 
instrument.39
Nevertheless, because of the ‘bottom-up’ nature of the funding formulae, it is possible to 
establish the theoretical allocations to each region for 2007-13 and to compare these with 
the theoretical allocations under the Berlin formula in 1999 and the actual allocations for 
the 2000-06 period. The theoretical allocations should be treated with caution since they 
do not represent actual outcomes; however, they do illustrate the impact of changes in 
eligibility and prosperity, as well as negotiating prowess, on the distribution of funding. 
Figure 20: Changes in Objective 1 Status 2000-06 / 2007-13 
 2000-6 2007-13 
Andalucía Objective 1 Convergence 
Castilla-La Mancha Objective 1 Convergence 
Extremadura Objective 1 Convergence 
Galicia Objective 1 Convergence 
Asturias Objective 1 Phase-out 
Murcia Objective 1 Phase-out 
Ceuta  Objective 1 Phase-out 
Melilla  Objective 1 Phase-out 
Castilla y León Objective 1 Phase-in 
Valencia Objective 1 Phase-in 
Canarias  Objective 1  Phase-in; OMR 
Cantabria Objective 1 phasing-out Competitiveness & Employment 
Source: Inforegio and FP Working Document Fiche 57, Rev 4. 
3.6.1 Convergence regions 
The discussion that follows focuses on the theoretical funding allocation to current 
Objective 1 regions in Spain, set in the context of actual funding allocations for 2000-06. As 
already mentioned, these regions account for just over 58 percent of the Spanish 
population and almost 70 percent of Spanish commitment appropriations for 2000-06. A 
further 20 percent is accounted for by the Cohesion Fund, but as this is not explicitly 
regionalised, it is not possible to draw conclusions for the regions about changes in the 
Cohesion Fund allocation.  
A key point to note is that the overall decline in funding in Spain derives from a fall in 
Convergence funding which is, itself, largely a product of the relative improvement in 
prosperity of the Spanish regions. As such, all the current Objective 1 regions see a 
significant decline in their allocations under the formula for 2007-13 (see Figure 21). It is of 
                                                 
39 This view is also supported by the current government. See the intervention by Pedro Solbes in the 
parliamentary committee for Economy and Finance, 24 April 2006. 
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note that there is a large degree of variation depending on whether the calculations are 
based on 2000-06 Berlin-method allocations or actual allocations.  
Under the 2000-06 Berlin methodology scenario, most regions fall into one of two groups: 
those where the decline in allocations is around 60 percent – Valencia, Castilla-León, Murcia 
and Asturias; and those where the reduction is around 30 to 35 percent – Andalucía, Galicia, 
Castilla-La Mancha, Canarias and Ceuta and Melilla. The impact of the special additions in 
mitigating the reduced allocations to Canarias and Ceuta and Melilla is clear from these 
groupings – their reductions have been pegged at the levels of those applicable to most 
Convergence regions. The region of Extremadura would see a theoretical reduction of less 
than 20 percent in the budget allocation. This reflects its relatively poor performance in 
terms of GDP per head: for example, for 1994-96, GDP(PPS) per head stood at 55 percent of 
the EU15 average; for 2000-02, the equivalent figure is 59 percent of the EU25 average – a 
significant relative decline. The corresponding figures for Andalucía are 57 percent of the 
EU15 average for 1994-96 and 69 percent of the EU25 average for 2000-02. 
Figure 21: Allocations to Objective 1 Regions 2000-06 and 2007-13 (€m, 2004 prices) 
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Source: EPRC calculations and Marco Comunitario de Apoyo (2000-2006) para las Regiones 
Españolas del Objetivo 1. 
 
The magnitude of decline for individual regions is significantly different when the 
theoretical allocations for 2007-13 are compared with the actual regional allocations for 
2000-06, particularly in the cases of Andalucia, Asturias, Castilla-León, Extremadura, 
Canarias and Ceuta and Melilla. Under this scenario, three main groups can be identified: 
Extremadura, Castilla La Mancha and Galicia (where the decline is around 35-40 percent), 
Ceuta and Melilla, Canarias, Valencia and Murcia (where the range is from 50 to over 60 
percent) and Asturias and Castilla-León (with falls of 70-75 percent). In contrast to the 
previous scenario, it is now the region of Andalucía which sees the lowest theoretical fall 
(around 15%), reflecting the significantly lower actual allocation in 2000-06 compared to 
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the Berlin methodology allocation - and this despite its relatively strong growth 
performance over the period. 
This pictured is mirrored in the per capita allocations illustrated in Figure 22. This figure 
also throws into relief the impact of the special pleading made in the budget negotiations 
for Ceuta and Melilla and Canarias.  
Figure 22: Per Capita Annual Allocations to Objective 1 Regions 2000-06 and 2007-13 
(€m, 2004 prices) 
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Notes: (i) The population figures used are 1996 for the 2000-06 allocation and 2002 for the 
2007-13 allocation. (ii) The Phase-out and Phase-in allocations have been averaged as an 
annual figure over the period, whereas in practice the amounts will be tapered. 
Source: EPRC calculations and Marco Comunitario de Apoyo (2000-2006) para las Regiones 
Españolas del Objetivo 1. 
 
 
3.6.2 Regional Competitiveness & Employment 
As already noted, the basis for allocating funding under the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment strand is significantly different from that under Objective 2; in particular, 
there are no specifically-designated assisted areas. This is not, however, to say that, in 
practice, funding will be allocated on a flat per capita basis; as for the Convergence 
regions, the actual allocation will doubtless take account of a number of criteria. 
Nevertheless, because Competitiveness & Employment region coverage is almost double 
Objective 2 coverage, and overall funding has declined, the impact on the existing 
recipients is likely to be significant (see Figure 23).  
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Figure 23: Allocations to Objective 2/3 Regions 2000-06 and Competitiveness & 
Employment Regions 2007-13 (€m, 2004 prices)  
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Note: The region of Cantabria was a transitional Objective 1 region in 2000-06.  
Source: EPRC calculations, Plan Objetivo No.2, Zonas españolas incluidas en el Objetivo nº 
2 de los Fondos Estructurales Europeos and Marco Comunitario de Apoyo 2000-2006 España 
Objetivo nº 3: Apoyar la adaptación y modernización de las políticas y sistemas de 
educación, formación y empleo. 
 
 
 
Cantabria aside (where the ending of Objective 1 transitional arrangements implies a 70 
percent decline in actual receipts), the most significant differences between current 
(Objective 2 and 3) allocations and those implied by the allocation keys used for the 
Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective concern País Vasco, Navarra and 
Aragón where the percentage decline is in the order or 65, 55 and 50 percent respectively. 
At the other end of the scale, the relative decline in Baleares (2 percent) and Madrid (15 
percent) is much lower, mainly reflecting the significantly lower Objective 2 eligible 
population coverage in the 2000-06 period. In the remaining two intermediate regions, 
Cataluña and La Rioja, the decline is in the order of 40 to 30 percent respectively. The 
differential impact on the regions is also clearly demonstrated in the per capita allocations 
illustrated in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24: Per Capita Annual Allocations to Objective 2/3 Regions 2000-06 and 2007-13 
(€m, 2004 prices)  
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Notes: (i) The region of Cantabria was a transitional Objective 1 region in 2000-06. (ii) The 
total regional population figures used are 1996 for the 2000-06 allocation and 2002 for the 
2007-13 allocation. 
Source: EPRC calculations, Plan Objetivo No.2, Zonas españolas incluidas en el Objetivo nº 
2 de los Fondos Estructurales Europeos and Marco Comunitario de Apoyo 2000-2006 España 
Objetivo nº 3: Apoyar la adaptación y modernización de las políticas y sistemas de 
educación, formación y empleo. 
 
However, as stressed earlier, there is not necessarily a direct connection between the 
allocation keys produced on the basis of theoretical allocations under the Commission 
methodology and actual receipts. Indeed the Commission has written to all the Member 
States suggesting an alternative allocation, based on weightings that it considers are more 
appropriate for the country concerned.40 Moreover, in practice, it will be for the Member 
States to decide how to share out Regional Competitiveness and Employment funding. 
3.7 Implications for Spain 
Spain was the single largest beneficiary of the structural actions budget for 2000-06, 
accounting for almost 27 percent of total commitment appropriations across the EU15. 
Enlargement, shifting EU averages and domestic growth have impacted on the eligibility of 
Spanish regions for Cohesion policy support, reducing the available allocation to Spain from 
around €60 billion (in 2004 prices) for 2000-06 to under €30 billion for 2007-13 under the 
Commission’s initial proposal and just over €30 billion in the final UK Presidency 
agreement. All Cohesion policy categories experienced significant cutbacks; on the other 
hand, there were some notable additional funding sources won during the negotiations, 
including transitional Cohesion Fund support of €3250 million, an extra €2000 million of 
ERDF assistance for Spanish R&D and specific provisions of almost €537 million for Canarias 
and €50 million for Ceuta and Melilla. Overall, the fact that the Spanish Cohesion policy 
                                                 
40 These letters are not in the public domain and it is not known what breakdown the Commission has 
suggested to Spain. 
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budget increased in the course of negotiations which saw a reduction of almost 10 percent 
in total Cohesion policy funding was a significant achievement. 
Even so, the implications for Spain of a budgetary cutback of the order of one-half are 
obviously major. Moreover, the reduced funding does not apply uniformly but has 
potentially significant differentiated regional impacts. Thus, in most continuing 
Convergence regions (Extremadura, Castilla La Mancha and Galicia) a theoretical funding 
decline of the order of 35-40 percent is experienced, the exception is Andalucia where the 
cutback is closer to 15 percent due to the significantly lower 2000-06 allocation relative to 
the Berlin-based methodology. For those regions losing Objective 1 status, two groups can 
be identified: those where the decline ranges from 50 to around 60 percent - Ceuta and 
Melilla, Canarias, Valencia and Murcia - with Ceuta and Melilla and Canarias at the lower 
end of the range due to the additional provisions in the latter stages of the negotiations; 
and those witnessing a decline of 70 to 75 percent - Asturias, Castilla-León and Cantabria - 
largely because of the significantly greater actual 2000-06 allocation than under the 
theoretical Berlin method in the former two regions and the ending of transitional 
arrangements in the latter.  
With respect to the current Objective 2 (future Regional Competitiveness and Employment 
Objective) regions, the magnitude of decline is greatest in País Vasco, Navarra and Aragón 
(65, 55 and 50 percent respectively). This is followed by an intermediate group comprising 
Cataluña and La Rioja where the fall is in the order of 40 and 30 percent respectively. At 
the other end of the scale, the decline in Madrid (15 percent) and, particularly Baleares 
(2%), is much lower, reflecting the relatively lower Objective 2 eligible population coverage 
in the 2000-06 period. 
Such differential impacts obviously increase the pressures on the Spanish government to 
modulate the impact of the Cohesion policy funding changes; it remains to be seen, 
however, just what will be done in this regard. 
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4. NEGOTIATING THE REGULATIONS 
The formal negotiations on the Commission's draft European Structural Funds regulations 
began in July 2004. The negotiations were pursued along two parallel tracks: the European 
Structural Funds regulations in the Council's Structural Actions Working Group (SAWG) and 
wider budgetary and financial matters through the Ad-Hoc Group on the Financial 
Perspectives (the Friends of the Presidency group). This section provides a more detailed 
analysis of the content and key implications of the Commission’s proposals, including the 
main areas of contention and the changes made to the various titles of the general 
regulation during the negotiations.41 The analysis draws on research undertaken for the 
EoRPA regional policy research consortium,42 including interviews with national officials in 
Spain, as well as a review of the Commission’s regulatory proposals, unpublished 
compromise texts and the latest draft of the regulations following the agreement by the 
Council on 5 May 2006. A final section draws together the key implications for Spain. 
4.1 Objectives and general rules on assistance (Title I) 
The objectives and general rules on assistance comprise five chapters which set out the 
Structural Funds’ scope and definitions, objectives and missions, geographic eligibility, 
principles of assistance, and financial framework. Compared to the 2000-06 period, the 
main changes are fourfold. First, the proposals aim to provide for a clearer distribution of 
tasks between Member States and the Commission by defining the principles governing 
relations between them. Second, a more precise definition of the elements required for 
programme implementation has been provided to increase the level of legal security for the 
Member States. Third, the number of objectives has been reduced to three, increasing the 
geographical and thematic concentration of Cohesion policy. A final key change is the 
application of proportionality to the principle of additionality. Since issues relating to the 
financial framework and geographic eligibility have already been discussed in detail, the 
focus below is on the key principles of assistance.  
Complementarity, consistency, compliance (Article 8): This principle states that the 
Structural Funds should complement national, regional and local interventions, which are 
consistent with EU priorities, as reflected in the Community Strategic Guidelines, the 
National Strategic Reference Frameworks and the Operational Programmes. The main 
change introduced during the negotiations has been the addition of thresholds for 
earmarking Structural Funds to EU priorities (with relevant categories of expenditure 
defined in a new annex): 75 percent under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment 
Objective and 60 percent for the Convergence Objective. The thresholds apply to the EU15, 
although the New Member States may adopt them voluntarily. The Member States are 
required to progressively increase the contribution made towards meeting the set targets 
                                                 
41 Given space restrictions, Titles 8 (committees) and 9 (final provisions) are omitted due to their 
lesser significance. 
42 See: Bachtler J and Wishlade F, Searching for Consensus: The Debate on Reforming EU Cohesion 
Policy, EPRC European Policies Research Papers No 55, 2004; and Bachtler J and Wishlade F, From 
Building Blocks to Negotiating Boxes: The Reform of EU Cohesion Policy, EPRC European Policies 
Research Papers No 57, 2005 
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relative to their respective national baseline averages over the 2000-06 period. A final 
change is the application of the principle of coordination to the different Funds, the EAFRD, 
the EFF, the EIB and other existing interventions; indeed, coordination has now been 
incorporated within the proposed article title.  
Partnership principle (Article 10): The Commission’s proposal aims to strengthen the 
partnership principle by broadening the list of partners to include urban authorities for the 
first time and by naming the list of ‘appropriate bodies’ (e.g. representing civil society, 
environmental partners, non-governmental organisations, and bodies responsible for 
promoting equality between men and women). Resistance to this proposal has been 
expressed by the majority of Member States who, though generally supportive of the 
principle, consider the Commission’s approach to be too prescriptive. In particular, they 
would like to replace the word “namely” by “such as” in the header listing the partnership 
authorities and bodies. Some Member States have also proposed the addition of 
‘environmental’ to the ‘economic and social partners’, although this is not considered 
necessary by others who believe that environmental authorities are already adequately 
covered within the article. There has also been opposition to the extension of the 
partnership principle to the preparation and monitoring of the National Strategic Reference 
Framework.  
Proportionality (Article 11): The proportionality principle is a new feature of the reform 
proposals, which, according to the Commission’s initial formulation, allows for 
interventions to be proportional to the EU contribution in relation to control, evaluation 
and the participation of the Commission in Monitoring Committee meetings. During the 
course of the negotiations, most Member States agreed that the scope of proportionality 
should be further extended. Amongst the main new fields suggested were strategy 
development, programming and management, the selection of indicators and reporting. On 
the other hand, some Member States (especially amongst the new Member States) were 
completely opposed to the principle (arguing that it is discriminatory), whilst others argued 
that specific fields of application should be excluded (e.g. the participation of the 
Commission in Monitoring Committees). The latest compromise increases the precision of 
the text, including the extension of proportionality to new fields, but based on total public, 
instead of EU, expenditure. 
Additionality (Article 13): The Commission’s proposals provide for important changes to 
the additionality principle (under which EU support should be additional to rather than 
simply replacing national funding) by restricting its verification to the Convergence 
Objective and by providing for financial corrections in the case of non compliance. Some 
new Member States expressed strong opposition arguing that the proposal introduces a form 
of discrimination by differentiating between Convergence Objective and other regions. A 
broadly-held view amongst the Member States is that the verification of additionality 
should be made more flexible and the provisions relating to financial corrections should be 
weakened or even eliminated. 
Gender Equality (Article 14): For the first time, a separate article on gender equality has 
been included in the general regulation in order to ‘ensure that equality between men and 
women and the integration of gender perspective is promoted during the various stages of 
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implementing the funds’. During the course of the negotiations, a number of Member States 
proposed extending the principle to include non-discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic 
group, religion, disability, age and sexual orientation. Others, including Spain, would prefer 
to stress the importance of gender equality by providing it with greater visibility in the 
regulation.43 On the other hand, some Member States have argued that the article is 
unnecessary as gender equality is already a horizontal principle.  
4.2 Strategic approach to cohesion (Title II) 
The new strategic approach to cohesion represents an important change from the previous 
policy period. It introduces a new strategic layer of planning involving the adoption of 
Community Strategic Guidelines (CSG) at the EU level to support the drawing up of National 
Strategic Reference Frameworks, which will in turn form the basis for drafting the new 
generation of Operational Programmes. The other current programming documents 
(Community Support Frameworks, Single Programming Documents and Programme 
Complements) will be discontinued. The Commission’s aim is to strengthen the legitimacy 
of EU Cohesion policy, improve the monitoring of the impact of Structural and Cohesion 
Funds as well as of EU priorities, and to increase the coherence between Community 
priorities and national/regional priorities. The title is structured into three chapters, 
covering the Community Strategic Guidelines, the National Strategic Reference Framework, 
and strategic follow-up and annual debate. 
Community Strategic Guidelines (Articles 23-24): In terms of the content of the CSG, a 
majority of countries have expressed support for the Commission’s proposals but with two 
firm caveats. The first, as argued by Spain and others (e.g. France, Finland, UK, Ireland and 
Portugal), is that the CSG should be high-level, succinct and non-prescriptive. The second 
key condition is that the CSG should not contain a national strand. Other issues of concern 
from a Spanish perspective relate to the need to place stress on the coordination and 
articulation of Cohesion policy with other Community policies with a territorial impact and 
also on the underlying objective of cohesion (e.g. by specifically referring to Articles 158 
and 159 of the Treaty). With respect to the provisions for mid-term review to take account 
of changes in Community priorities, the Member States have demanded that this should 
only be justified where the changes are “major” and that there should be no obligation to 
modify the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) or Operational Programmes 
(OPs). 
National Strategic Reference Framework (Articles 25-26): The Commission proposals 
envisage that the NSRF will be in two sections. A strategic section will specify the strategies 
for the Convergence and Competitiveness Objectives consistent with the CSG and including 
territorial and thematic priorities. In the operational section, a list of OPs and an indicative 
annual allocation by Programme, Fund and Objective will be specified. Interviews with 
Spanish officials indicate that they would have preferred the operational part of the NSRF 
to have greater weight and detail (e.g. in terms of the types of concrete actions that it will 
                                                 
43 Interviews indicate that Spanish representatives had proposed this on at least two occasions during 
the negotiations. 
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be possible to finance) in order to increase the certainty for drafting and negotiating the 
OPs. In terms of changes during the negotiations, provisions for a limited number of 
quantified performance and impact indicators have been opposed by most Member States, 
while optional provisions have been added for the inclusion of the territorial objective and 
the specification of the procedures for coordinating EU Cohesion policy with national, 
sectoral and regional policies. Last, the Commission’s proposal that the NSRF be 
“negotiated with the Commission” has been revised to require Member States only to 
prepare the NSRF “in dialogue with the Commission”. 
Strategic follow-up and annual debate (Articles 27-30): Member State opposition to the 
Commission draft has centered on three key areas. First, the proposal that Member States 
report annually on the progress and achievements of their Cohesion policy programmes in 
meeting Community strategic objectives has been diluted; reporting will now take place on 
a triennial basis. Second, strategic monitoring has been integrated into an (albeit simple) 
section of the annual National Reform Programmes relating to the Lisbon agenda. Third, the 
provisions for Commission reporting have been made vaguer and, arguably, weaker. For 
example, references to “follow-up measures to be taken by Member States and the 
Commission in light of its Conclusions” have been deleted. The latest draft simply states 
that the Commission will provide a summary assessment of the triennial Member States’ 
reports incorporated within the Cohesion Report which will then be examined by the 
Council and submitted to other EU institutions for debate (the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions).  
4.3 Programming (Title III) 
Major changes to programming have been proposed. To simplify decision-making processes, 
the Community Support Framework and the Programming Complement will no longer be 
required, leaving only one programming and management tool: the mono-fund Operational 
Programme. A second key change involves increased flexibility in managing Operational 
Programmes, particularly regarding financial management which will now only take place at 
the priority level. The programming title is structured into two chapters, general provisions 
on the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, and programming content. 
General provisions on the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund (Articles 31-35): In 
terms of the presentation and approval of Operational Programmes, the main concern of 
the Member States has related to the need to specify deadlines. In addition, some Member 
States have opposed the provisions for the Commission to change draft Operational 
Programmes, leading to a less restrictive formulation. According to the initial proposals, 
the Commission “shall request the Member State to revise the programme accordingly” 
when it is inconsistent with the CSG or NSRF. In the latest version, the Commission can only 
“invite the Member State to provide all necessary additional information, and, where 
appropriate, to revise the proposed programme accordingly”. In terms of the revision of 
Operational Programmes, the negotiations have focused on clarifying the reasons 
permitting revision, requiring agreement with the Member State concerned to launch the 
process and introducing a deadline for Commission approval. Opposition by the new 
Member States to mono-fund (as opposed to integrated) programmes and to the inclusion of 
the Cohesion Fund in mainstream programming (which implies the application of the 
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decommitment rule) has not been successful. Finally, most Member States have favoured an 
increase in the cross-financing rate between ERDF and ESF programmes from 5 percent to 
at least 10 percent. 
Programming content (Articles 36-44): The core Commission proposals relating to the 
content of Operational Programmes are unlikely to be subject to much change, despite 
criticism of excessive detail from some Member States. The main changes envisaged include 
eliminating the requirement to list of reasons justifying the approach to thematic, 
geographical and financial concentration (under the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective) and the requirement to specify actions for adapting to changes in 
the European and international economic environment (under both the Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment and the Convergence Objectives). In addition, provisions 
for the inclusion of a list of cities, for related procedures for urban sub-delegations, and for 
actions for inter-regional cooperation seem likely to become optional in the face of Member 
State opposition.  
With respect to the treatment of major projects, some countries have expressed concerns 
about delocalisation and have proposed the establishment of preventative checks, while 
others, including Spain, would like to see large projects subject to a standard threshold of 
€50 million. However, these changes are unlikely to be introduced given the lack of overall 
support.  
Finally, the percentage annual allocation allowed for funding European Commission 
technical assistance has been reduced from 0.3 percent to 0.25 percent. This contrast with 
new provisions to create a specific Operational Programme for Member States’ technical 
assistance, although the funding limits for this remain as initially proposed by the 
Commission.  
4.4 Effectiveness (Title IV) 
The key proposed regulatory changes under this title primarily involve an increased degree 
of flexibility for evaluation, modifications to the performance reserve and the 
establishment of a new national reserve. Ex-ante evaluation will be compulsory for each 
programme under the Convergence Objective but, for the other two Objectives, Member 
States can decide what level of evaluation is required (programme, groups of programmes, 
themes, Funds) based on their needs. Mid-term evaluations are to become optional, 
although evaluation should be undertaken during the programming period where problems 
arise and/or programme modifications are required. Compared to the current period, 
where compulsory ex-ante, mid-term and ex post evaluations are required for all 
interventions, the proposals imply greater flexibility through a significant reduction in the 
number of evaluations required and by allowing Member States to implement evaluations 
adapted to their needs. The other two main proposals involve setting the performance 
reserve – renamed the “quality and performance reserve” – at the Community level and a 
new National contingency reserve to respond to unforeseen circumstances (disasters, etc.).  
Evaluation (Articles 45-47): Most Member States have called for even more flexibility on 
evaluation. Opposition to uniform evaluation methods established by the Commission (e.g. 
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by Spain and Greece) has led to the specification that Commission guidance should only be 
“indicative”. The requirement to carry out an ex-ante evaluation for the NSRF has been 
dropped. Under the Convergence Objective, provisions have been made to undertake ex-
ante evaluations for more than one programme where duly justified, while the need to 
draw up an evaluation plan has been made optional. In addition, the setting of a 
compulsory date for undertaking a mid-term evaluation has been rejected and the reasons 
justifying the need to undertake an evaluation during the programming period have been 
relaxed, satisfying particular concerns raised by a national official interviewed in Spain.  
Reserves (Articles 48-49): The Member States have expressed mixed views about the 
proposal for a Community reserve for quality and performance; some are in support and 
others firmly opposed. The result is that the reserve is to become national and optional 
instead of Community-based and compulsory. This contrasts with the current period where 
the performance reserve was obligatory for all programmes, although it was also 
implemented at the national level (after similar objections during the negotiations for the 
current regulations). The proposed national contingency reserve will also become optional 
and provisions have been made for its allocation to a specific national programme or within 
Operational Programmes. Interview evidence suggests that Spain is unlikely to set up a 
contingency reserve.  
4.5 Financial contribution by the Funds (Title V) 
The key objectives underpinning the proposed changes are to increase the flexibility in the 
financial management and monitoring of Operational Programmes, to reduce the 
probability of conflicts between national and Community rules, and to simplify EU co-
financing arrangements. The Commission proposed that this be achieved by applying co-
funding rates at the measure (instead of priority) level; by replacing detailed EC regulations 
on common eligibility rules with national eligibility rules; and by providing for Fund 
participation to be calculated on the basis of public expenditure alone. The main areas of 
disagreement during the negotiations and the changes proposed to the four chapters which 
make up this title are discussed below.  
Contribution of the Funds (Article 50-53): The possibility for modulating assistance is no 
longer reserved for those priorities which are important for the Community Strategic 
Guidelines, but is now also available for national and regional priorities too. Greater 
flexibility has also been introduced into the co-financing arrangements; ceilings will only be 
applicable at the level of the Operational Programme, whereas the original formulation 
applied co-financing caps at the priority level. Three further changes were made in the 
final UK Presidency budget agreement which eased co-financing rules for the poorer 
Member States. First, in Member States where average per capita GDP from 2001 to 2003 
was below 85 percent of the EU25 average (the ten new Member States plus Greece and 
Portugal) the ERDF or ESF co-financing rate was increased by 10 percent to 85 percent. 
Second, other countries eligible for the Cohesion Fund (in practice, Spain) are now eligible 
for an ERDF or ESF co-financing rate of 80 percent for both Convergence Objective (up from 
75 percent) and Phase-in regions (up from 50 percent). Third, in Member States where 
average per capita GDP from 2001 to 2003 was below 85 percent of the EU25 average and 
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for German Eastern Länder under the Convergence Objective, the calculation of total 
eligible expenditure now includes private, as well as public, expenditure.  
Revenue-generating projects (Article 54): Member States concerns have centred on 
clarifying the definition of a revenue-generating project and introducing new provisions 
regarding deductions (where it is not possible to estimate the revenues in advance) and 
clawback after programme closure (within a maximum period of three years). 
Eligibility of expenditure (Article 55): The main change proposed is for the eligibility date 
for expenditure to be brought forward to the date of the submission of the Operational 
Programme rather than 1 January 2007. A specific reference to large projects has also been 
added under eligible expenditure, with some Member States (e.g. France, Greece, Hungary 
and Slovakia) requesting that the preparation costs for such projects also be granted 
eligibility. 
Durability of operations (Article 56): Some countries have supported the Commission’s 
proposal of a seven-year durability period within which aid may be recovered if substantial 
modifications are made to the recipient firm or public body or as a result of the cessation 
of activities, while also proposing reinforced guarantees to prevent delocalisation risks (e.g. 
France, Netherlands, Austria and Germany). However, strong opposition from the new 
Member States suggests that the durability period is likely to remain at five years, as in the 
current regulations. 
4.6 Management, monitoring and controls (Title VI) 
The Commission proposed a number of important changes to management, monitoring and 
control requirements. The functions of the three main authorities (certifying, managing and 
audit) and Member States responsibilities will be more clearly defined from the outset. The 
principle of proportionality will be applied to management and control rules in relation to 
the intensity of EU participation and the level of funding in the programmes. An 
independent Member State body will assess the conformity of management and control 
systems at the beginning of the programming period to provide the Commission with 
guarantees on the systems in place. The introduction of a national audit strategy will allow 
annual and final certification of systems in place. Greater cooperation between national 
authorities and the Commission is proposed to avoid duplication of effort and EC audits will 
only be undertaken in exceptional circumstances. The title is structured into four chapters, 
covering management and control systems, monitoring, information and publicity, and 
controls:  
Management and control systems (Articles 57-61): In terms of general principles, 
opposition to the proposed obligations relating to adequate resources for each body, 
effective internal audit arrangements, and the existence of procedure manuals, has led to a 
less-binding compromise stating that Member States shall provide “procedures for ensuring 
the correctness and regularity of expenditure”. Requirements for “effective” arrangements 
for auditing the operations of the system have also been made less strict. Under the article 
on the designation of authorities, the separation between the functions of paying and 
receiving payments has been abolished. Two other changes in relation to the audit 
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authority are the extension of the period within which the Member States must present the 
audit strategy by three months to nine months, and a new provision to allow the submission 
of a document on the legality and regularity of programme closure expenditure.  
Monitoring (Articles 62-67): In terms of Monitoring Committees, the main changes include 
a new provision to allow for the creation of a single Monitoring Committee for several 
programmes; the dropping of the reference to partners (Article 10 of the regulation) in 
relation to the Committee’s composition; and the extension of the deadline for approving 
selection criteria by two months to six months. Changes to the arrangements for monitoring 
include the specification of a new provision for electronic data exchange between the 
Commission and the Member States and the elimination of the reference to Commission 
examination of the monitoring and evaluation indicators. Last, with regard to the annual 
report and final report on implementation, the main area of opposition by the Member 
States concerned the requirement to provide information on financial implementation by 
field of intervention. 
Information and publicity (Article 68): The only likely change to information and publicity 
requirements is the restriction of these activities to co-financed programmes; this 
eliminates their application in respect of operations. 
Controls (Articles 69-73):44 Changes to the control proposals mainly concern management 
and control systems falling within the responsibility of the Member States, though 
proportionality thresholds have also been adjusted. The deadline for the submission to the 
Commission of a description of the control systems has been extended from three months 
from programme approval to twelve months. The Member States have also argued that the 
accompanying report should be required to provide an assessment of the “setting up” of 
the systems, as opposed to the systems per se (which would imply the transfer of a new 
responsibility to the Member States). Further, where corrective measures are to be taken, 
the Member States must inform the Commission of these and their subsequent 
implementation, replacing the original provisions for a plan to be drawn up in agreement 
with the Commission. In terms of the application of the principle of proportionality, a 
number of Member States have been pushing for an increase in the thresholds within which 
the Commission automatically relies on national audit controls - involving Operational 
Programmes where the EU co-financing rate is under 40 percent (compared to 33 percent) 
and with total public expenditure of €750 million (compared to €250 million). Some new 
Member States, notably Poland and Hungary, remain strongly opposed to such provisions on 
the grounds that they introduce a form of discrimination. 
4.7 Financial management (Title VII) 
The main proposals under this title include provisions for the pre-funding of 7 percent for 
the Structural Funds and 10.5 percent for the Cohesion Fund; intermediary payments at 
                                                 
44 For an extensive analysis of the implications of the proposed reforms to control systems from the 
perspective of one of the Spanish negotiating officials, see:  Rodriguez Laso A (2005) ‘“Auditoría 
Única” y Control de los Fondos Estructurales: Los sistemas de control en el próximo periodo 2007-
2013’, Cuenta con IGAE, Marzo 2005, No.11, pp20-29 
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priority level, with application of the rate for the priority to the amount of public 
expenditure presented by the Member State; the possibility of operating “partial” 
programme closure for completed operations; and the introduction of transparent rules for 
the interruption, suspension or retention of payments. The main objectives of these 
reforms are to simplify payment procedures and programme closure; to improve the legal 
security for actors and increase transparency; and to clarify payment procedures under the 
Structural Funds regulation by bringing it into line with the Council’s general financial 
regulation applicable to the EU budget. 
Financial management (Articles 74-98): In terms of budgetary commitments, a number of 
Member States (e.g. France, Czech Republic, Austria, Belgium, Italy) have demanded that 
the notification of annual commitments should continue to be made by 30 April each year. 
Similar flexibility is sought under the common rules for payments, with a majority of 
countries proposing that provisional forecasts for payment applications should continue to 
be submitted by the end of April rather than the end of January, as proposed by the 
Commission. With regard to the requirement for electronic exchanges of financial 
transactions, exceptions have been made in the case of “forces majeur”, notably IT 
systems’ malfunctions or the lack of a lasting connection. Proposed changes to the 
declaration of expenditure include a more precise formulation of “total” eligible 
expenditure paid by beneficiaries (although some countries have opposed this given that 
Community financing is based on public expenditure); a slightly increased margin of 
flexibility for pre-financing aid schemes; and the inclusion of certified expenditure paid in 
contributions to financial engineering funds.  
Modifications to the pre-financing proposals were made in the final UK Presidency 
agreement. Advance payments under the Structural Funds will be 7 percent over three 
years for the EU10 plus Romania and Bulgaria, and 5 percent over two years for the EU15. 
For the Cohesion Fund, the respective figures will be 10.5 percent and 7.5 percent. A 
further change introduced during the negotiations is that interest earned from advance 
payments will be regarded as a national resource towards the Member States’ public 
contribution.  
The main changes to the proposals on interim payments are the elimination of the 
requirement that reference payments are conditional on obtaining assurance on 
management and control systems (since this is already covered by the modifications to the 
title on controls) and the setting of a deadline for Commission responses on the 
acceptability of payments requests.  
With regard to payments of balance and programme closure, Member States’ demands have 
mainly centred on extending the date for the Commission receiving the relevant documents 
by six months, clarifying the provisions for Commission acceptance of the closure 
declaration (notably in terms of the independence of the audit authority), extending the 
date for decommitting funds by six months, clarifying the situations/dates for the 
declaration of programme closure, and stipulating that amendments of the balance will not 
affect the date of the closure of the programmes.  
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The main issue of contention under the proposals for the interruption, withholding and 
suspension of payments relates to the procedures for the withholding of payments, which a 
number of Member States would like to see deleted. A reduction of the interruption of 
payments period from six to three months is also sought. Regarding the suspension of 
payments, some countries (e.g. Spain) would like greater accuracy in the drafting of the 
article. 
Member State views over “automatic decommitment” have been mixed. The new Member 
States have strongly opposed the extension of the rule to the Cohesion Fund, while a 
majority of the EU15 have supported this proposal. Changes under the UK Presidency 
budget agreement have led to the extension of the n+2 rule across all funds by one year 
(i.e. n+3) for those Member States where average per capita GDP from 2001 to 2003 was 
below 85 percent of the EU25 average (namely, the ten new Member States plus Greece 
and Portugal). Other modifications include greater flexibility where legal proceedings and 
administrative appeals prevent declarations and with regards to delays in the case of large 
projects.  
Financial corrections (Articles 99-103): The main issues of contention in relation to 
financial correction are demands for greater definitional clarity and a distinction between 
the terms irregularity and administrative error. Broad opposition has been expressed to the 
“presumption of a systematic problem” where the irregularity concerns a statement of 
expenditure.  
4.8 Implications for Spain 
The Commission’s reform proposals introduced a new rationale for Cohesion policy, a new 
policy architecture and new implementation arrangements. In terms of policy rationale, 
many of the changes proposed go with the grain of developments in Spain. The enhanced 
stress on the Lisbon and Gothenburg agendas fits well with changes which have already 
been made in the domestic policy environment. In similar vein, the increased weight 
attached to territorial cohesion chimes with specific Spanish views about the treatment of 
the Outermost regions (Canarias) and more general concerns in Spain about the position of 
areas facing geographic handicaps (especially islands, mountainous regions and border 
areas). 
As regards the new architecture of Cohesion policy, the main Spanish interest has been on 
the financial implications of the new approach, unsurprising given the significant impact of 
enlargement on Convergence coverage in Spain and the related importance of agreeing 
satisfactory transitional provisions (for Phase-out and, especially, Phase-in regions). 
However, also important to Spain has been the retention of the Regional Competitiveness 
and Employment Objective in the face of pressures from some countries that it be 
discarded, limiting Cohesion policy to poorer regions and Member States. The related shift 
from a geographic to a thematic focus under this priority was also welcomed by Spain. 
Taken together with the award of significant transitional Cohesion Fund support and the 
creation of a Technological Fund, this has allowed the whole country to remain eligible for 
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some form of Cohesion support, a significant consideration in a highly-devolved country like 
Spain. 
With respect to specific implementation issues, Spain obviously has very considerable 
experience and expertise in the operation of the Structural and Cohesion Funds, built up 
over three programming cycles. It is thus comfortable with the retention of the key 
Structural Funds principles of multi-annual planning, integrated development strategies, 
partnership, co-finance and concentration, all of which have by now been successfully 
internalised. At the same time, the Commission’s declared intentions of simplifying 
procedures (through, for instance, a more proportionate approach) and also of further 
decentralising processes also reflects domestic trends and concerns. 
As in most Member States, perhaps the key implementation issue for Spain will be whether 
the proposed regulatory changes lead to a more simplified and decentralised approach in 
practice. Certainly, most of the general changes proposed (under Title I) fit with Spanish 
interests or, at worst, are Spain-neutral. For instance, the need align EU, national, regional 
and local priorities through a system of Community Strategic Guidelines, National Strategic 
Reference Frameworks and Operational Programmes is viewed positively in Spain. 
Moreover, the new Lisbon targets are not considered to be a problem, the belief being that 
Spanish programmes will easily meet the targets set. The strengthening of the partnership 
principle also reflects domestic priorities while, as in most other (EU15) Member States, the 
introduction of proportionality and the new restrictions relating to the additionality are 
both welcomed. As mentioned earlier, Spain also favours the new separate article on 
gender equality in line with the increased domestic prominence of this issue in recent 
years. 
The new strategic approach to cohesion (Title II) is also viewed positively in Spain. Indeed, 
as noted above, Spanish officials would have preferred the operational part of the NSRF to 
be given greater weight and detail as a way of helping to ease the OP drafting process. As 
in all Member States, the reduced reporting requirements which seem to be emerging from 
the negotiations (with reporting now planned only every three years, apart from limited 
annual reporting as part of the Lisbon process) are obviously also favoured. 
The remaining titles relate to more technical implementation issues – programming, 
effectiveness, co-financing, monitoring and control, and financial management. As is to be 
expected, the negotiations have seen Member States supporting, and indeed trying to 
strengthen, moves towards simplification. There are two areas where the changes 
introduced have been of particular interest to Spain: first, in respect of evaluation, where 
pressures from Spain (and others) has led to a more indicative approach being adopted 
combined with greater flexibility in the need to undertake evaluations during the 
programming period; and second, with regard to co-financing rates, where the budget 
negotiations increased the rate of EU co-finance from 75 percent to 80 percent for the 
Spanish Convergence regions and from 50 percent to 80 percent for the Phase-in regions. 
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5. POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS 
This section analyses the likely policy and institutional impacts of Cohesion policy reform in 
Spain. The first part provides an overview of regional views and key issues on the regulatory 
and financial impacts of the reform proposals. The second part focuses on the preparations 
currently under way for implementing the future regulations, in terms of the process of 
developing the National Strategic Reference Framework and future Operational 
Programmes and their potential content. The analysis draws on interviews with programme 
managers and officers in ten regions between December 2005 and March 2006, 
supplemented by a review of the Updated Mid-Term Evaluations for selected regions. 
5.1 Regional views on the budgetary and regulatory frameworks 
5.1.1 Regulatory issues 
The Commission’s regulatory proposals for Cohesion policy reform have been broadly 
welcomed by the Spanish regions consulted. The general view is that the proposals do not 
represent a radical change from the current arrangements, but rather a further progression 
in the direction already introduced by the previous round of Cohesion policy reform. A 
commonly held view amongst the interviewees is that, to the extent that the reforms 
simplify programme management and introduce the principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity, the new implementation system is unlikely to present a challenge, not least 
because of the well-consolidated experience which has been gained of managing 
significantly higher levels of EU funding within a more rigid and administratively complex 
framework. Nevertheless, a number of important issues were raised during the 
consultations. 
Simplification: Although the proposals for simplified implementation arrangements have 
been broadly welcomed, practically all the regions consulted expressed doubts over 
whether simplification would actually be delivered in practice. This is partly because the 
regulations are perceived to be rather vague (more so than the current regulations 
according to some), implying a wide margin for Commission interpretation during the 
implementation stage, and also because of the experience in the current period where 
simplification was also promised but did not subsequently materialise. In addition, some 
regions questioned the Commission’s motivation for reform, arguing that the changes were 
largely a self-interested reaction to the expected administrative challenge for the 
Commission of implementing Cohesion policy in an expanded EU of 25, rather than a 
genuine attempt to simplify Cohesion policy for the Member States.  
Programme documentation: The elimination of the Programme Complement is viewed as a 
positive step in terms of streamlining the development and adoption of programmes, as 
well as increasing the flexibility of subsequent management and implementation. On the 
other hand, it remains likely that a similar document will be required by the regions, if only 
for internal management purposes. Similar benefits were expressed in relation to the 
suppression of the Community Support Framework and Regional Development Plans. The 
introduction of the National Strategic Reference Framework was generally welcomed by the 
regions and, unlike in some federal countries with strong regional governments such as 
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Germany, was not considered to raise “new” conflicts with respect to the domestic 
institutional balance between central and regional government in the field of regional 
development.  
Financial management: Related to the previous point, programme managers welcomed the 
streamlining of financial programming and implementation through the reduction to two 
financial tables (covering the whole programme annually and by priority for the whole 
period respectively). Again some doubts were expressed over whether the Commission 
would cease to be able, or at least to continue to try, to influence activity at the measure 
level.  
Mono-fund programmes: There was a mixed response in relation to proposals for mono-fund 
programmes. One programme manager had strong reservations, fearing a loss of policy 
coordination between the funds at all levels (EU, national and regional), a duplication of 
organisational structures and bodies at each of these levels, and a major loss in what is 
perceived to be a core element of Cohesion policy added value. This was especially felt to 
be the case in a context of much lower levels of future Structural Funds receipts where the 
“economic” benefits of Cohesion policy support are less significant. On the other hand, a 
number of other programme managers welcomed the mono-fund proposals, arguing that the 
different nature of the funds (in terms of policy characteristics, types of expenditure, 
regulatory guidelines etc.) make their ‘genuine’ integration into a single document 
extremely difficult in practice. In this context, it was considered somewhat ironic that, in 
the current period, the Spanish government originally submitted mono-fund programmes in 
order to simplify the programming process but was required by the Commission to reconvert 
these into integrated programmes. 
Cohesion Fund: A number of Spanish regions welcomed the proposals to integrate the 
Cohesion Fund within the mainstream programmes. It is felt that this could increase the 
coherence and synergies between ERDF and Cohesion Funded interventions and also provide 
the regions with a greater degree of financial certainty because of the need to programme 
the fund annually and on a regional basis (at least for the share devolved to the regions and 
local corporations) at the start of the new period. 
Audit controls: A further positive development observed by a number of regions concerns 
the proposals to commit to stronger coordination between the Commission, central 
government and the regions in terms of audit controls and the application of the 
proportionality principle. It is hoped that this will reduce the duplication of control checks 
as well as the excessive burdens placed on programme managers in terms of time and legal 
uncertainty, although some interviewees remain cautious over whether this commitment 
will be followed through in practice.  
Expenditure and thematic eligibility: Another area of expected flexibility welcomed by the 
regions is the proposal to decentralise decisions on expenditure eligibility to the national 
level (with certain exemptions such as VAT). This was contrasted with the current period 
where a specific regulation governing eligible expenditure contains a detailed range of 
restrictions. With respect to the thematic priorities, future Convergence regions were 
satisfied with the proposals, considering them to offer an even broader “menu” of eligible 
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interventions than in the current period (e.g. Andalucía). On the other hand, in some 
regions, concerns were noted with respect to potential co-funding restrictions in specific 
areas such as waste treatment actions (Madrid and La Rioja) and training related innovation 
activities outside the region (Castilla-La Mancha), notwithstanding general overall 
satisfaction with the future thematic priorities.  
5.1.2 Financial issues 
The scale and impact of the expected cuts in Cohesion policy funding to the Spanish regions 
can only be fully determined after an Inter-Institutional Agreement has been reached on 
the final EC budget and the official allocations by Member State are made known by the 
Commission. Nonetheless, four main factors can be highlighted which condition regional 
authorities’ views on the financial impacts of Cohesion policy reform. These concern: EU 
policy changes and designation status; decisions over the internal distribution of funding 
within Spain; trends in domestic regional policy expenditure; and future changes to the 
regional financing model and related compensatory mechanisms.  
(i) EU policy changes and designation status 
For each region, the current level of Structural Funds receipts and the implications of 
relative growth trends and enlargement for future designation and budgetary allocations 
are evidently key factors determining the magnitude of decline in Cohesion policy 
resources. As already noted, the greatest relative falls will occur in those regions losing 
Objective 1 status – whether due to the statistical effect of enlargement (Asturias, Murcia, 
Ceuta and Melilla), natural growth (Valencia, Canarias and Castilla-León) or the ending of 
‘transitional’ arrangements (Cantabria).45 Within these three groupings, the relative cut in 
funding will be greatest in the latter two groups given their direct incorporation into the 
Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective, although the position of Canarias 
relative to Valencia and Castilla-León is significantly ameliorated by its status as an 
Outermost region and the negotiation of special provisions, as previously noted.46  
Two further financial constraints impact upon the last two groups as a result of their shift 
to Regional Competitiveness and Employment status. The first relates to the new domestic 
co-financing rates. For Cantabria, the impact is negative given that the rate will increase to 
50 percent (up from 25 percent in the current period), although no particular difficulties in 
                                                 
45 In the Cantabrian case, there is considerable resentment by the current regional government about 
its designation as a future Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective region and the loss of 
financial resources that this implies. It is considered that in the negotiations for the current period, 
the region was prematurely and unfairly designated as a transitional (instead of full) Objective 1 
region due to the use of outdated population data from 1991, despite the availability of more recent 
data at the time, and the central government’s greater concern with ensuring that Valencia retained 
Objective 1 status in view of the far greater number of inhabitants and funding involved. 
46 According to central government officials, Canarias is expected to receive 50 percent of current 
Structural Funds receipts in the next period. See: Serrano C, Montoro B and Viguera E (2006) 
Resultados del Acuerdo de Perspectivas Financieras 2007-2013, Boletín ICE Economico, No.2689. 
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raising the necessary co-finance are expected, not least in view of the reduced funding 
involved. This contrasts with lower co-financing requirements for Phase-in regions (20 
percent for Castilla-León and Valencia, down from the current 25 percent, but 15 percent 
for Canarias as an Outermost region) and Convergence regions, as a result of the 
modifications to the Commission proposals under the UK Presidency’s EU budget 
agreement. The second concern, expressed by the Phase-in region consulted (Castilla-León) 
as well as by Cantabria, relates to the loss of eligibility for national regional policy funding: 
at present, national regional incentives for business are restricted to areas with Article 
87(3)(a) status under EU Competition policy rules; while the Inter-Territorial Compensation 
Fund for public works investment is currently only available to Spanish Objective 1 regions.  
Although Phase-in regions may benefit from transitional arrangements on losing Article 
87(3)(a) to (c) status, there is still considered to be a future threat for business and 
investment attraction in a region such as Castilla-León where a significant part of the 
territory is surrounded, on the one side, by Madrid which has strong competitive advantages 
as the capital city, and, on the other, by future Convergence regions in Spain (Galicia and 
Extremadura) and Portugal (Norte and Centro regions), which retain full aid area status. 
With respect to the loss of eligibility for the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund (which 
currently only applies to Objective 1 regions with GDP per capita less than 75 percent of 
the EU average), concerns in Castilla-León over the loss of this important source of 
infrastructure funding are evident from requests by the Regional President to the central 
government that those provinces within the region that remain below the 75 percent 
threshold maintain eligibility (e.g. the provinces of Zamora and Salamanca).  
In Cantabria, similar issues have been raised, fearing the conversion of the region into a so-
called “island of inequality” due to its position between Asturias and Castilla-León, which 
remain eligible for national regional incentives, albeit on less generous terms, and the País 
Vasco which has a highly autonomous fiscal system providing important flexibility in terms 
of expenditure and policy incentives.47 More recently, however, the Regional Minister for 
Economy and Finance has claimed that, despite the region’s future designation as a 
Regional Competitiveness and Employment region, continued eligibility for both national 
regional incentives and the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund has been successfully 
negotiated with the central government.48
In terms of Phase-out regions, mixed views were reported about the transitional funding 
arrangements agreed by the European Council in December 2005. The programme manager 
                                                 
47 Parlamento de Cantabria, Diario De Sesiones, Año XXIV, VI Legislatura, 15 de abril de 2005, Número 
75 Página 1771 Serie B, Comisión De Economía y Hacienda, Sesión celebrada el viernes, 15 de abril de 
2005, Comparecencia del Consejero de Economía y Hacienda, a petición propia, a fin de informar 
sobre los acuerdos alcanzados por los Presidentes de Cantabria, Córcega y Molise sobre el futuro 
reparto de fondos europeos. 
48 Parlamento de Cantabria, Diario de Sesiones, Año XXV, VI Legislatura, 8 de Marzo de 2006,  Número 
105 Página 2567 Serie B, Comisión de Economía y Hacienda, Sesión celebrada el Miércoles, 8 de Marzo 
de 2006, Comparecencia del Consejero de Economía y Hacienda, a petición propia, a fin de informar 
sobre el último Comité de Seguimiento del POIC 2000-2006. That said, the new regional aid map also 
has to be agreed with the Commission. 
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for Murcia strongly objects to the provisions for more favourable financial treatment for 
Phase-out regions where these account for over one-third of the total population of the 
country concerned. This is viewed as unfair and against the spirit of cohesion as it leads to 
a situation where regions with a similar level of GDP per capita to Murcia, but within a 
richer Member State (Germany), receive more funding – and this despite the fact that Spain 
has a higher proportion of its population designated as Objective 1/Convergence. Similar 
criticisms have been expressed by regional government Ministers in Asturias.49 On the other 
hand, the programme manager from the city of Melilla unsurprisingly welcomed the 
“special provisions” for an additional €50 million to be shared with Ceuta in connection 
with the immigration challenges faced, viewing the extra envelope as a significant 
contribution to offsetting the reduction in overall funding for the city from de-designation. 
Officials from the central government claim that Ceuta and Melilla will only lose 30 percent 
of current receipts as a result.50
(ii) Decisions over the internal distribution of funding 
A second key factor influencing the financial outcome for individual regions concerns the 
final decision over the internal distribution of Structural Funds resources within the Spanish 
state, both in terms of the mainstream Structural Funds programmes (and the participation 
of the central government within these) and the territorial distribution of the Cohesion 
Fund and the new Technological Fund.51 All the regions consulted highlighted the 
importance of increasing regional participation in the allocation of the global Structural 
Funds budget within Spain, involving the reduction or elimination of centrally-managed 
multi-regional programmes and/or less central participation in regional programmes.  
Similarly, obtaining a fair (and if possible devolved) share of the Cohesion Fund and the 
new Technological Fund is a top priority for the regions in the current negotiations with the 
central government. With respect to the Technological Fund, there are clear tensions 
between the regions. In a joint statement to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the 
current Objective 2 regions have requested that the central government change the criteria 
proposed by the Commission for the territorial distribution of the Fund in order to increase 
the allocation to regions with greater potential demand and spending capacity. 
Convergence regions (e.g. Galicia and Andalucía) firmly oppose this, arguing that the 
Technological Fund is ERDF-funded and must therefore be distributed according to equity 
criteria at the regional level in line with its Treaty base. They also argue that the proposed 
                                                 
49 La Nueva España (2005) ‘Valledor reclama que Asturias reciba al menos 600 millones de los fondos 
de cohesión de la UE’ 18.01.06, No.1157 
50 Serrano C, Montoro B and Viguera E (2006) Resultados del Acuerdo de Perspectivas Financieras 
2007-2013, Boletín ICE Economico, No.2689.  
51 The indicative split of the €2000 million Technological Fund is 75 percent for Convergence 
Objective regions (of which 5 percent for Phase-out regions) and 25 percent for Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment Objective regions (of which 15 percent for Phase-in regions). 
However, the Spanish government is entitled to change these percentages at any point before the 
adoption of the Structural Funds General Regulation. 
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changes would be inconsistent with the government’s advocacy of “technological cohesion” 
at the EU level. 
For its part, the central government has stated its intention to use the Cohesion Fund as a 
buffer by concentrating resources in those regions witnessing the largest relative decline in 
funding compared to the current period.52 More recently, the Minister of Economy and 
Finance, has argued that no phasing-out region should witness a cut of more than 33 
percent relative to the current period or 50 percent in the case of Phase-in regions, in line 
with the negotiation position at the EU level.53 However, the issue of increasing regional 
participation in the national Structural Funds budget allocation remains controversial and 
will most certainly be resisted by the central government, especially given the new context 
of budgetary relations between Spain and the EU. A high ranking official from the 
Directorate General for EU Funding has argued that, because of the significant increase in 
Spain’s contributions to the EU budget over the next programming period, and given that 
this contribution is financed exclusively through the Treasury and not regional government 
budgets, it would be inappropriate to further increase the fiscal squeeze on the central 
government by reducing its participation within Cohesion policy (46 percent of total funds 
over the 2000-06 period).54 This argument is contested by regions such as Cataluña given 
their status as net contributors to the Spanish state budget and hence indirectly to the EU 
budget too.55
(iii) Trends in domestic regional policy spending 
A third factor influencing the significance of future cuts in Cohesion policy funding relates 
to the level of current Structural Funds receipts as a proportion of regional economic 
development spending. In the 2000-06 period, the Objective 1 regions with the lowest 
financial dependency - calculated as the percentage of Structural and Cohesion Funds 
expenditure as a proportion of public budgetary expenditure eligible for co-financing – were 
Cantabria (as expected given its transitional Objective 1 status), Valencia and Asturias 
(with a range of 18-22 percent), followed by Andalucía, Murcia, Galicia and Melilla (30-32 
percent) and Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla-León, Ceuta, Extremadura and Canarias (33-37 
                                                 
52 Navarro A and Viguera E (2005) Las Perspectivas Financieras 2007-2013 y la Posición de España, 
Documento de Trabajo (DT) Nº 22/2005, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid. The Prime Minister has 
specified that phase-in and phase-out regions would be prioritised, in his report to the Cortes 
(Parliament) on the final EU Council budget which took place on 21st December 2005.  
53 Diario de Sesiones del Senado, Año 2006, VIII Legislatura, Comisiones. Núm. 303, Comisión General 
de las Comunidades Autónomas, celebrada el lunes 3 de abril de 2006, Comparecencia, a petición del 
Grupo Parlamentario Popular en el Senado, del señor Vicepresidente Segundo del Gobierno y Ministro 
de Economía y Hacienda, D. Pedro Solbes Mira, para tratar sobre las repercusiones financieras en las 
Comunidades Autónomas de la negociación del reparto de fondos europeos a partir de 2007  
54 Cordero Mestanza G (2005) ‘La rentabilidad económica y social de los Fondos Estructurales: 
experiencia y perspectivas’  Presupuestos y Gasto Público, Núm. 39, Secretaría General de 
Presupuestos y Gastos, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. The Minister for Economy and Finance has 
restated these views more recently in a Senate debate (April 2006).  
55 Generalitat de Catalunya Memorandum (2005) Posición del Gobierno de Cataluña en relación de las 
perspectivas financieras de la UE 2007-13 y la reforma de la política regional, Febrero 2005. 
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percent).56 Given these percentages, the expectation is that Phase-in regions such as 
Castilla-León and Canarias will experience a relatively greater impact on domestic budgets, 
than, for instance, Valencia (the other Phase-in region).57 On the other hand, according to 
interviewees in Castilla-León, the Structural Funds expenditure profile in the current policy 
phase has been heavily weighted towards the first three years so that by 2006 the transition 
to the new programming period will be relatively smooth. It is noteworthy that in 
Andalucía, the largest Cohesion policy beneficiary in Spain, the relative decline in the 
Structural Funds’ share of the regional domestic investment budget has been very 
significant in recent years, accounting for 15 percent in 2005 compared to a high of 35 
percent (in 1996).58
(iv) Future changes to the regional financing model 
A last issue with a crucial bearing on broader budgetary relations concerns the forthcoming 
reforms to the regional government financing model in Spain, partly related to the ongoing 
debates over reform to the regions’ statutes of autonomy. The government is aiming to 
further increase the financial autonomy and fiscal co-responsibility of the regions, building 
on longer-term trends in the evolution of the system.59 These changes could provide an 
important cushion to absorb declining Cohesion policy revenue within overall regional 
government budgets in the future.60 Other proposals closely connected to the future 
financing model, but aiming specifically to address the expected shortfall in Cohesion 
policy revenues, include an increase in funding for Convergence regions through a 
significantly strengthened Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund and, for other regions, the 
creation of a similar compensatory fund financed through public debt.61 Subsequent 
statements by the Minister for Economy and Finance, Pedro Solbes, seem to suggest that 
the latter proposal has been shelved in favour of reducing the national public debt.62  
In the Catalan case, and as part of the negotiations over the reform to its statute of 
autonomy, the central government has committed to increasing infrastructure investment 
in the region (excluding Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund expenditure) to reach a share 
                                                 
56 Cordero Mestanza G (2005), op.cit.  
57 Cordero Mestanza G (2005), op.cit.  
58 Parlamento de Andalucía, Diario de Sesiones, Comisión de Asuntos Europeos, Número 35, Serie B VII 
Legislatura Año 2005, Sesión celebrada el Miércoles 19 de octubre de 2005. 
59 Current proposals include increasing the share of taxes available to the regions (from 33 percent to 
50 percent in income tax, from 35 percent to 50 percent in VAT, and from 40 percent to 50 percent in 
“special taxes”) as well as increasing their regulatory powers over them (in the case of income tax). 
60 The negotiations over the new model are expected to be concluded by the end of 2006 and to come 
into force in January 2008. 
61 El País (2005) ‘El Gobierno creará un fondo para compensar las menores ayudas de la UE’ 23.11.05; 
EFE (2005) Gobierno busca alternativas fondos UE y reforma fiscal progresiva, Efe, Madrid, 22.11.05.  
62 El País (2006) ‘Solbes cierra 2005 con el primer superávit en las cuentas públicas de la democracia’  
El País, 01.03.06. 
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equivalent to the Catalan contribution to national GDP over a seven year period. This 
addresses a long-standing criticism from political and social actors in the region of not 
receiving a “fair share” of state infrastructure investment. This should provide an 
important boost to infrastructure projects in Cataluña, especially given the high reduction 
in Cohesion Fund investment anticipated in the region. At present, six other regions are 
also requesting increased state funding in their proposed statutes of autonomy, although 
these demands have yet to be agreed by the central government.63
5.2 Implementing the new regulations: the National Strategic 
Reference Framework 
At the time of writing, EU regulatory and financial frameworks had yet to be approved. 
Nevertheless, as in other EU Member States, the Spanish administration has begun the 
process of developing future strategies and programmes to allow a timely start to 
programme implementation. This section reviews the process and likely content of the 
National Strategic Reference Framework while the next considers the associated 
Operational Programmes, focusing on the key changes in relation to the current period and 
the potential challenges involved. 
5.2.1 NSRF process 
The National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) in Spain is being coordinated and 
drafted by the Directorate General for EU Funding (Ministry of Economy and Finance). The 
process involves various rounds of consultation, involving other government Ministries and 
the regions, and external support from an economic development consultancy. It can best 
be characterised as “mixed or collaborative” (similar to the approaches adopted in the UK, 
Austria, Finland, Sweden and France) as opposed to “top-down” (as in Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Ireland or the Netherlands) or “bottom-up” (as in Belgium and Germany)64  
The NSRF was at an early preparatory stage during the fieldwork stage for this research 
(February 2006). The process of determining the key programming decisions will be mainly 
concentrated between March and June 2006. The development of the NSRF was initially 
launched in 2005 with a request (in March and again in June) by the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance to the regions for socio-economic and SWOT analyses, future strategic 
priorities and the relative weighting of these priorities.  
Not all regions were able to respond immediately or fully to this request. In particular, 
given the budgetary uncertainty over Cohesion policy resources, a number of regions were 
uneasy about assigning relative weightings to strategic priorities, especially when domestic 
regional development strategy processes had not been finalised. For example, in Castilla-La 
Mancha, the pact for competitiveness, which represents an important component of the 
                                                 
63 El País (2006) ‘Seis autonomías buscan mejor financiación y perfilar su definición en los Estatutos’ 
El País, 02.05.06 
64 Polverari L, McMaster I and Gross F (2005) A strategic approach to cohesion? Developing 2007-13 
Structural Funds programmes, IQ-Net thematic paper, 17(2), European Policies Research Centre, 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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overall regional development strategy, was only signed in December 2005. Also, the 
employment pact, which will determine the regional strategy for human resources and 
training to 2010 and underpin ESF co-financed interventions, was still in the process of 
negotiation during February 2006. Similarly, in Murcia, the process for developing the so-
called Horizonte 2010 Plan, the overarching regional economic development strategy for 
the next programming phase, had not moved beyond the initial launch stage. A number of 
regions therefore utilised the results of their Updated Mid-Term Evaluations in relation to 
the socio-economic analysis and SWOT updates to inform their initial input to the National 
Strategic Reference Frameworks. 
The Directorate General for EU Funding obtained further input from central government 
Ministries during the end of 2005 and early 2006, which helped it to determine their 
potential contribution and participation to priorities and interventions under the 
competence of the state in the NSRF. During the same period, multilateral meetings were 
held between the central and regional governments to discuss the scope of eligible 
interventions under the new programmes. There were also informal meetings in the regular 
regional policy and economics forum which addressed a wider range of issues on future 
programming. Preliminary discussions were held, too, with the Commission in the annual 
meetings addressing the planning and direction of the future programmes, amongst other 
matters. Further multilateral meetings are scheduled between the central government and 
the regions before the summer in order to finalise the draft NSRF and parallel OPs, enabling 
formal negotiations with the Commission to take place during the September-December 
2006 period. A provisional timetable including the key stages in the drafting and approval of 
the NSRF and OPs is provided in Figure 25.  
From the perspective of the central government, the development of the NSRF does not 
present a particular challenge because the Directorate General for EU Funding has always 
played a strong coordinating role in the programming process, particularly in the Objective 
1 Community Support Framework, but also with respect to the Objective 2 SPDs. The 
overall assessment of the process amongst the regions consulted was mixed. Some 
expressed dissatisfaction with the transparency and level of feedback received from the 
central administration in collating and aggregating the input of regional governments and 
other central Ministries to the NSRF. One programme manager considered the process to be 
less organised than in the previous programming period where deadlines were proposed 
well in advance to complete the (albeit more onerous) regional development plans and 
documentation. Others argued that the process is well on track, pointing instead to failures 
at the EU level in terms of the delays in reaching budgetary agreement and the subsequent 
approval of the draft regulations and Community Strategic Guidelines which must form the 
basis for the drafting of the programming documents. Further, the point was made that, in 
the previous policy phase, the programming process was not anyway completed until almost 
two years after the budgetary and regulatory agreements had been reached, not least 
because of the need to approve the Programme Complements. Set against this, the current 
process is perceived to be well on schedule, potentially allowing a much more timely start 
to the new round of programmes. 
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Figure 25: Provisional calendar for negotiating the NSRF and OPs in Spain: 2007-13  
Period Member State Commission Council 
October 2005 1st meeting on the NSRF between the Commission 
and central government 
 
 
January 2006 2nd meeting on the NSRF between the 
Commission and regions 
Informal agreement between the Member States 
and the Commission on the NSRF index 
February Internal central 
government discussions 
on the NSRF 
Discussions between 
the central 
government, regions 
and relevant Ministries 
Informal discussions 
between Commission 
services and 
central/regional 
governments, including 
sectoral themes 
(multiregional 
programmes, 
Technological Fund 
etc.) 
March Development of NSRF 
Priorities: objectives, 
strategic priorities and 
approach 
 
April NSRF draft ready to initiate informal negotiations 
with the Commission 
May NSRF negotiations with Commission, to continue 
in June/July 
 
June  
July OP’s drafted 
 Formal adoption of 
Structural Funds 
Regulations 
August  
September Formal adoption of 
Community Strategic 
Guidelines 
October 
OP negotiations between the Commission services 
and central/regional governments 
November Formal submission of NSRF and OPs to the 
Commission 
December 
January 2007 
Formal approval by the Commission of OPs and 
NSRF 
 
Source: DG Regio (2006) Marco Estratégico Nacional de Referencia: Objetivos estratégicos y 
ámbitos fundamentales en relación con España en el período de programación 2007-2013, 
Borrador de Trabajo elaborado por DG REGIO en colaboración con DG EMPL, 10 March 2006 
5.2.2 NSRF content 
As noted above, the programming of the draft NSRF and Operational Programmes is not 
expected to be completed until July 2006.65 Nonetheless, some indication of the likely 
structure and content of the NSRF can be gleaned from the document’s index page, the 
Spanish Lisbon National Reform Programme, central government reactions to the 
Commission’s proposals for the Community Strategic Guidelines and a recent statement by 
the Minister of Economy and Finance on the future priorities.  
                                                 
65 The precise content of the NSRF was still unknown by the regions at the end of February 2006, 
although they had been supplied with a contents page indicating the structure and key headings of 
the document. 
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Figure 26 National Strategic Reference Framework in Spain: 2007-13 
Heading Content Pages EU Regulatory base 
1. Economic and Social Cohesion in Spain: convergence and 
regional competitiveness in the globalised, knowledge 
economy. 
Analysis of economic 
development 
disparities. 
40 Art.25, Heading 4a 
1.1. Introduction (explanation of the strategy development 
process including consultation with partners)  
1.2. Trends in the world economy: globalisation and 
technological development 
1.3. Trends in the European economy: internal market, 
euro and enlargement 
1.4. Analysis of the Spanish economy 
1.5. Analysis of the labour market 
1.6. Analysis of regional disparities over the last decade 
and future perspectives 
1.7. Analysis of social disparities 
1.8. SWOT analysis by main regional typologies: 
competitiveness and convergence 
1.9. Analysis of Spanish regions’ position in relation to 
Lisbon objectives 
   
2. Objectives and Priorities of the NSRF Adopted Strategy 60 Heading 4b 
2.1. Introduction (including approach to “Lisbon 
earmarking” by Objectives) 
2.1.1. NSRF and the Commission’s CSG 2007-13 
2.1.2. Relationship and synergies with Lisbon NRP 
2.1.3. Horizontal programming principles: equal 
opportunities, sustainability and partnership. 
2.2. Strategic Lines 
2.2.1. Research, Technological Development and Innovation 
2.2.2. Business Development 
2.2.3. Information Society 
2.2.4. Promoting entrepreneurship and improving the 
adaptability of workers, firms and entrepreneurs 
2.2.5. Promoting Employability, Social Inclusion and Equal 
Opportunities 
2.2.6. Increasing and improving human capital 
2.2.7. Transport 
2.2.8. Energy 
2.2.9. Environment and sustainable development 
2.2.10. Rural and urban development2.2.11 Technical 
assistance 
   
3. Performance and/or Adjustment Reserve    
4. Territorial Cooperation  
Includes priority 
themes, areas (maps) 
and key actors 
 
5  
4.1. Cross-border cooperation 
4.2. Trans-national cooperation 
4.3. Inter-regional cooperation 
   
5. List of Programmes (regional and multi-regional by 
Objectives, including the Cohesion Fund) 
Includes strategic 
priorities by 
objectives 
5/tables Heading 4c 
6. Indicative annual financial allocation by Fund Breakdown by programmes  10/tables Heading 4d 
7. Convergence Regions  5 Heading 4e 
7.1. Measures to increase administrative efficiency 
7.2. Coordination between funds 
7.3. Coordination with other EU policies and finance 
7.4. Ex-ante verification of additionality and co-finance 
guarantees 
   
8. Statistical Annexes    
8.1. Analysis of national economic trends 
8.2. Regional statistics 
8.3. List of authorities and contact details 
   
Source: DG Regio (2006) Marco Estratégico Nacional de Referencia: Objetivos Estratégicos y 
ámbitos fundamentales en relación con España en el período de programación 2007-2013, 
Borrador de Trabajo elaborado por DG REGIO en colaboración con DG EMPL, 10 March 2006 
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An overview of the structure of the NSRF is provided in Figure 26, which sets out the key 
headings that are expected to appear in the document’s index page. In terms of the 
strategic orientation, ten priority lines have been identified, including: research, 
technological development and innovation; business development; the information society; 
promoting entrepreneurship and improving the adaptability of workers, firms and 
entrepreneurs; promoting employability, social inclusion and equal opportunities; 
increasing and improving human capital; transport; energy; environment and sustainable 
development; rural and urban development.  
The strategic context underpinning the central government’s future economic development 
priorities in relation to the EU’s Lisbon agenda is provided in the Spanish National Reform 
Programme (NRP), submitted to the European Commission in October 2005. The two core 
objectives identified are to gain per capita income parity with the EU25 average by 2010 as 
well as an employment rate of 66 percent. To achieve the objectives, seven priorities have 
been established concerning macroeconomic and budgetary stability; transport 
infrastructure and water resources; human capital; R&D and innovation; competition, 
regulation and public sector efficiency and competitiveness; the labour market; and 
entrepreneurship. Specific objectives and a range of concrete measures for each of the 
priorities are listed in the NRP. However, the document does not specify how the future 
NSRF or Operational Programmes will align with and contribute to the National Reform 
Programme, a criticism also noted by the Commission in its review of the NRP.66 It remains 
unclear which priorities/measures will be incorporated within the future NSRF or what their 
relative weighting will be.  
A better indication of the likely content of the future Structural Funds programmes in 
relation to Cohesion policy (as opposed to broader Lisbon) priorities can be obtained from 
the central government’s reactions to the Community Strategic Guidelines. At the start of 
2005, the Commission held bilateral meetings with the Member States to discuss its 
proposals for the Community Strategic Guidelines and to exchange views on the targeting of 
priorities according to national and regional development needs. The meeting with the 
Spanish authorities took place in February 2005. At the meeting, the Spanish delegation 
suggested a range of potential lines of action that could fit with the “ten issues of 
Community interest for Cohesion policy” proposed by the Commission. According to an 
interview with one participant, a key objective of the Spanish delegation was to gain more 
detailed operational insight into the types of intervention that the Commission would be 
targeting. The lines of action proposed by the Spanish delegation are listed below (Figure 
27). This provides a provisional outline of the potential interventions being considered by 
the central government, albeit at an early stage of the programming process.  
                                                 
66 Although this is to be expected given that the National Reform Programme was submitted 3 months 
before the key strategic decisions over the programming of the Structural Funds were to be taken. 
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Figure 27: Future Priorities and Actions? 
EU Priorities Potential Action Lines 
Accessibility Completion of the basic infrastructure network/national multi-modal axes 
Cross-border multi-modal axes 
South-West Europe High-Speed Trains 
Railway inter-operability with French corridors 
Railway axis Portugal-Spain-Rest of Europe 
Information 
Society 
E-government (public administration, health, justice, cultural heritage) 
Science and Education (national system of primary and secondary education) 
Business (productivity, universities, training) 
Science and Education (participation and internet access) 
Environment (New technologies and the environment) 
Environment Water supply and treatment infrastructure (desalination plants) 
Developing risk prevention and mechanisms for natural conservation of resources  
Deficit reduction in environmental infrastructures 
Protection of forest resources and biodiversity 
Sustainable construction models (more environmentally efficient) 
Implementing the Gothenburg Strategy 
Complying with VI Environmental Action Plan 
Complying with the EU Water Framework and other Environmental Directives  
Application of Best Available Techniques (BATs) 
R&D for waste prevention and recycling 
Kyoto 
Protocol 
Development of renewable energies (apart from wind energy) 
Developing an energy efficiency and savings plan and diversification of sources of energy for SMEs 
Efficient 
public 
administration 
Regulatory security 
Optimisation of IT tools 
Optimisation of controls 
Optimisation of co-financed actions 
Employment Promoting equal opportunities 
Improving the life-long training system and targeting new needs 
Promoting networks and training for researchers 
Promoting full/part-time indefinite contracts and risk prevention plans 
Promoting entrepreneurship 
Guidance, training and personalised unemployment plans 
Social inclusion plans 
Transnational and interregional cooperation (mainstreaming EQUAL) 
Innovation 
and 
technology 
Improving R&D infrastructures 
Improving participation in EU R&D Framework Programmes 
Promoting integration between research centres and researcher training 
Increasing private sector involvement 
Creation of Technology Platforms 
Increasing participation in large European platforms 
Increasing R&D expenditure (25% p.a.) 
Increasing transnational/regional R&D and Innovation collaboration 
Boosting the mobility of R&D and Innovation personnel 
Innovation 
and 
businesses 
Strengthening the innovation system 
Strengthening university-business networks 
Technology diffusion and renewal 
Support for regional innovation strategies (clusters and technology centres) 
Innovative SME support (adapting to regulation such as REACH) 
Boosting R&D and Innovation entrepreneurship 
Financing Improving risk capital investments 
Cooperation Promoting cross-border cooperation 
Promoting cooperation between regions with commercial/historic links (Mediterranean/N. Africa) 
Supporting island regions  
Source: Directorate General for EU Funding  
More recently, the Minister for Economy and Finance has specified the proposed ERDF 
priorities for the future Convergence regions (including Phase-out) and future Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment regions (including Phase-in) (see Figure 28 and Figure 
29).67 As illustrated in the tables, the priorities maintain a high degree of continuity with 
                                                 
67 Diario de Sesiones del Senado, Año 2006, VIII Legislatura, Comisiones. Núm. 303, Comisión General 
de las Comunidades Autónomas, celebrada el lunes 3 de abril de 2006, Comparecencia, a petición del 
Grupo Parlamentario Popular en el Senado, del señor Vicepresidente Segundo del Gobierno y Ministro 
de Economía y Hacienda, D. Pedro Solbes Mira, para tratar sobre las repercusiones financieras en las 
Comunidades Autónomas de la negociación del reparto de fondos europeos a partir de 2007  
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respect to the current period. The Minister also commented that a greater emphasis would 
be given to R&D and innovation, although infrastructure needs would also be covered 
alongside continued support for environment and transport infrastructure programmes that 
are currently being implemented.  
Figure 28: Objective1/Convergence Objective Priorities 
2000-06 2007-13 (ERDF) 
1. Improving competitiveness, employment, 
and developing production structures 
1. Knowledge-society (R&D and the 
information society). 
2. The knowledge society (innovation, R&D, 
the information society) 
2. Business development and innovation. 
3. Environment, natural habitats and water 
resources 
3. Environment, natural spaces, water 
resources and risk prevention. 
4. Human resources, employment and equal 
opportunities 
4. Transport and energy. 
5. Local and urban development 5. Sustainable, local and urban 
development. 
6. Transport and energy networks 6. Social infrastructures. 
7. Agriculture and rural development 7. Technical assistance and institutional 
capacity. 
8. Fisheries and aquaculture  
9. Technical assistance  
 
Figure 29: Objective 2/Competitiveness and Employment Objective Priorities 
2000-06 2007-13 (ERDF) 
1. Competitiveness and business 
development 
1. Knowledge-society, innovation and 
business development  
2. Environment, natural habitats and water 
resources 
2. Environment and risk prevention. 
3. The knowledge society (innovation, R&D, 
the information society) 
3. Transport and telecommunications 
networks and services 
4. Transport networks and alternative 
Energy Sources’ Infrastructure 
4. Sustainable, local and urban 
development. 
5. Local and urban development 5. Technical assistance. 
6. Technical assistance  
 
A key aim for the Commission (through the introduction of the National Strategic Reference 
Framework) is to increase the coherence between EU priorities, particularly the 
Lisbon/Gothenburg themes, and national and regional Structural Funds programmes. Early 
statements by national officials in Spain have indicated that the new strategic orientation 
was not perceived to be a particular challenge. For instance, at a conference organised by 
the Commission on the Lisbon strategy and Cohesion, Miguel-Angel Fernández Ordóñez, the 
(then) Secretary of State for Finance and the Budget, claimed that 80 percent of Structural 
Funds resources in Spanish Objective 2 regions already target the Lisbon strategy, 
compared to 60 percent in Objective 1 regions.68 Similarly, when the proposal to earmark a 
                                                 
68 Miguel Angel Fernández Ordóñez, Secretary of State for Finance and Budget, Ministry of Finance, 
Speech at the Conference on “Cohesion and the Lisbon Agenda: The Role of the Regions”, Brussels, 3 
March 2005. 
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proportion of Structural Funds resources to contribute to Lisbon objectives was 
subsequently presented by the Commission at the Hampton Court Council meeting in 
October 2005, the Spanish Secretary of State for EU Affairs, Alberto Navarro, claimed that 
it was merely a matter of “cosmetic presentation” and that the use of the Structural Funds 
in Spain already exceeded the 60 percent threshold by a wide margin.69  
However, at this stage there was no clear EU guidance on how Lisbon/Gothenburg 
objectives and themes could be operationalised in practice, notwithstanding the 
publication of the Commission’s draft Community Strategic Guidelines. A more recent 
assessment by the central government has disaggregated Structural Funds expenditure over 
the 2000-06 period by the main categories of expenditure proposed for earmarking 
Structural Funds to Lisbon/Gothenburg objectives (as annexed to the General Regulation). 
According to these calculations, the proportion of Structural Funds expenditure 
corresponding to the Lisbon strategy over the 2000-06 period has averaged 41 percent in 
Objective 1 regions and 54 percent in Objective 2 regions, somewhat below the EU-level 
targets for the future programming period (60 percent for Convergence Objective and 75 
percent for the Competitiveness and Employment Objective).70 A comparison of the overall 
national baseline positions for all EU Member States shows that Spain is ranked just below 
the EU15 and EU10 average (Figure 30).  
Figure 30: Earmarking Baseline Figures by Country (2000-06) 
 
Source: DG Regio 
 
                                                 
69 Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Generales, Comision Mixta para la Unión Europea, Año 2005, VIII 
Legislatura, Núm. 48, Sesión Núm. 13, celebrada el martes, 25 de octubre de 2005, en el Palacio del 
Congreso de los Diputados 
70 DG Regio (2006) Marco Estratégico Nacional de Referencia: Objetivos Estratégicos y ámbitos 
fundamentales en relación con España en el período de programación 2007-2013, Borrador de Trabajo 
elaborado por DG REGIO en colaboración con DG EMPL, 10 March 2006 
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However, given the future reduction in funding and recent trends in domestic economic 
policies it is unlikely that raising these overall percentages in the coming period will pose 
particular difficulties in Spain. Central government economic policy plans have certainly 
been giving increased prominence to Lisbon-oriented themes, notably in relation to the 
competitiveness agenda, through initiatives such as the ‘Plan for Dynamising the Economy 
and Boosting Productivity’, which was approved in February 2005 and which underpins 
much of the National Reform Programme. EU and domestic policy frameworks are therefore 
becoming increasingly aligned. Despite this, the central government’s strategy throughout 
the negotiation of the regulations has been to argue for gradual changes in the next policy 
phase in order to provide a smooth transition to the new strategic approach embodied in 
the reforms - not only in terms of the level of funding but also in the types of interventions 
that can be funded.71  
5.3 Implementing the new regulations: Operational Programmes 
5.3.1 OP process 
As with the NSRF, the Operational Programmes (OPs) were at an early stage of development 
during the fieldwork, not least because of the unavailability of precise figures on future 
allocations to regional programmes. Most regions were, however, in the process of 
consulting relevant partners (predominantly regional government departments) with the 
aim of having a draft OP ready before the summer (end of July). In general, the regions 
consulted considered that the process of developing the new OP's would be very similar to 
that for the current programming period. Some regions believed that there would be a 
greater degree of partner consultation and involvement in the drafting of the programmes 
this time round, partly because social and economic, environmental, and gender equality 
partners have become more firmly embedded within the Structural Funds framework during 
the implementation of the 2000-06 programmes. There was also expected to be a greater 
use of external support from economic development consultancies in developing the 
programmes (e.g. País Vasco, Andalucía and Murcia) and, for some, a greater effort to align 
domestic strategies more closely with the future EU programmes (notably in Andalucía and 
Murcia). 
5.3.2 OP content 
A core change underpinning the reform of EU Cohesion policy is the greater strategic focus 
on Lisbon/Gothenburg themes, centred on the Community Strategic Guidelines and the new 
National Strategic Reference Framework. Most of the regional authorities consulted did not 
consider that the new approach would present particular difficulties in designing the new 
strategies, not least because the current programmes are already making a sizeable 
contribution to Lisbon/Gothenburg themes but also because of increasing alignment 
between domestic regional development strategies and EU policy objectives.  
                                                 
71 Kaiser J.L. (2005) XXIV Jornada Temática: "Evaluación Ambiental Estratégica y Fondos Comunitarios 
2007-2013". Logroño, 30 de junio de 2005, Red de Autoridades Ambientales, p17. 
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Support for these conclusions is provided in a number of the Updated Mid-Term Evaluations 
(UMTEs). The Madrid programme update argues that 98 percent of ERDF investment targets 
Lisbon objectives, notably in terms of improving competitiveness, research and innovation 
through Priority 1 (Improving the competitiveness of the productive fabric) and 3 (The 
knowledge society). Nonetheless, it is recognised that, to move closer towards the Lisbon 
targets, a significant effort is still required in R&D, the integration of females into the 
labour force and employment levels. The País Vasco update also observes a high correlation 
between the programme and the Lisbon objectives, although the actual impact on these 
objectives is considered to be only moderate because of the relatively low level of 
Structural Funds resources as a proportion of overall domestic regional development 
expenditure.  
It is not only Objective 2 programmes that are assessed positively in the UMTEs with respect 
to Lisbon. The update for the Castilla-La Mancha Objective 1 programme finds that some 90 
percent of the programme is related to the Lisbon/Gothenburg objectives, notably in terms 
of improving competitiveness and the business environment. Priority 1 (Improving the 
business fabric) and 4 (Developing human resources, employability and equal opportunities) 
are singled out as playing a particularly important role. On the other hand, the update 
recommends the need to increase expenditure on R&D, to make greater progress in the 
integration of females into the labour market and to increase the level of training in the 
workforce.  
In Andalucía, the update commends the strong contribution made by the programme to the 
European Employment Strategy. A very significant emphasis on sustainable development is 
also noted. Over half of eligible expenditure is considered to target key Gothenburg 
objectives, particularly “improving the transport system and spatial planning” (through 
Priorities 5, 6 and 7) and “a more responsible management of natural resources” (through 
Priority 3). In the city of Melilla, a future Phase-in region, the update argues that there is a 
clear and direct contribution to Lisbon objectives, especially in relation to employment, 
human capital, the environment, and, to a moderate extent, the knowledge society, the 
business fabric and equal opportunities. On the other hand, in Extremadura (the poorest 
Objective 1 region in Spain), an evaluation undertaken for the European Commission in 
early 2005 found that only 32 percent of Structural Funds expenditure was related to Lisbon 
and Gothenburg objectives,72 mainly due to the lack of complementary between the 
region’s key regional development challenges, particularly infrastructure deficits, and the 
Lisbon Strategy.  
A weakness with the UMTE analyses is that they are based on the evaluators’ assessment of 
the alignment between the “objectives” of programme priorities and measures with (and 
their contribution to) Lisbon/Gothenburg targets (e.g. competitiveness and productivity, 
the creation of high quality jobs etc.). They do not reflect the correspondence between the 
typology of funded interventions with these targets, and their relative importance within 
the overall programme. As already noted, this is unsurprising given the lack of clarity and 
                                                 
72 Danish Technological Institute (2005) Thematic Evaluation of the Structural Funds’ Contributions to 
the Lisbon Strategy, Synthesis Report, February 2005 
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guidance at the EU level on the operationalisation of Lisbon/Gothenburg in policy content 
terms.  
Trends in domestic regional economic development strategies also suggest a close degree of 
congruence with EU priorities, particularly with regards to R&D and innovation. In the País 
Vasco, the government has refocused its economic development priorities in recent years in 
line with Lisbon and Gothenburg objectives, a strategy known as the Basque “second 
economic transformation”. Amongst the key initiatives are the Basque Environmental 
Strategy for Sustainable Development 2002-2020 and the Energy Strategy 2010, which are 
closely aligned with EU sustainable development and Kyoto objectives. The White Paper on 
the Basque Innovation System is also of note, building on the previous 2000-04 Basque 
Science, Technology and Innovation Plan (PCTI).73 Interestingly, only 4 percent of the 
€2.2bn investment effort under this plan was accounted for by EU funding. A similar RTDI 
drive is apparent in Madrid through the Fourth Plan for Scientific Research and 
Technological Innovation (IV PRICIT) and the related White Paper on Innovation 2005-2008. 
In Cataluña, the recently-agreed Strategic Agreement for Internationalisation, Quality 
Employment and Competitiveness is closely aligned with Lisbon, especially in terms of RTDI 
and employment. The Catalan 2005-2007 Action Plan for Policies Targeting Females is of 
particular note given the close connection with the key Lisbon target of increasing female 
labour market participation and employment rates.  
Similar trends are also apparent in the less economically-advanced regions. In Andalucía, 
the regional government has made a firm commitment to boosting the Knowledge Society, 
often referred to as the “third modernisation”. Evidence of this drive can be seen in the 
“Plan for Innovation and Modernisation of Andalucía” (PIMA), an integrated €5.8 billion 
strategy over the 2005-10 period, prioritising electronic equal opportunities, business 
development and entrepreneurship, environmental and energy sustainability, universities 
and knowledge industries, the information society, and intelligent public administration. 
The regional government’s Agency for Innovation and Development of Andalucía (IDEA) - 
the RDA formerly known as the Institute for Promotion of Andalucía - has also been strongly 
prioritising innovation in its business support schemes and activities over recent years.74 
Other recent initiatives include the creation of the Andalucian Technology Corporation at 
the end of 2005, incorporating 36 businesses and 7 financial bodies that aim to foster R&D 
and innovation activities in the region. The corporation expects to generate €200 million for 
joint R&D projects over the next four years, half of which should come from the public 
sector (including EU funding).75  
                                                 
73 Gobierno Vasco (2001) ‘Plan de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación’ Servicio Central de Publicaciones 
del Gobierno Vasco, Vitoria-Gasteiz. 
74 Yuill D, Polverari L, Mendez C, Michie R, Gross F, Downes R and Novotný V (2005) Innovative Forms 
of Support to Firms in Europe: A Comparative and Forward-Looking Analysis, Report to the Italian 
Institute for Industrial Promotion (IPI) and Ministry of Productive Activities, European Policies 
Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
75 El País (2005) La Corporación Tecnológica se crea con la meta de canalizar 200 millones a I+D en 
cuatro años, El País,  11.10.2005 
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Comparable initiatives are evident in La Rioja, with the establishment of an Agency for 
Knowledge and Technology which is expected to be operational by mid-2006, and the 
recent creation of Technology Centres, an experience which is already well consolidated in 
other Spanish regions such as Valencia (e.g. through the so-called RED IMPIVA - a network of 
23 Technology Centres and 4 Business and Innovation Centres coordinated by the Regional 
Development Agency). Interview evidence indicates that the current EU-funded “Regional 
Innovative Actions Plan” in La Rioja has provided an important learning experience for 
developing R&D actions in the 2007-13 period. A new Plan for Innovative Actions was 
initiated in January 2006 and will run in parallel to the new programmes, further enhancing 
the absorptive capacity of the region, particularly amongst SMEs. Castilla-León has also 
drawn on EU funding to support the region’s strong R&D and innovation policy drive since 
the mid 1990s - notably as one of the pioneering EU regions selected for piloting the 
European Commission’s “Regional Innovation Systems” strategy-building methodology.76 
Castilla-León is currently a Spanish leader in terms of domestic R&D and innovation 
investment effort.77  
Another good example of increased domestic regional policy activism in the field of R&D is 
Cantabria where there has been a five-fold increase in the R&D and innovation expenditure 
component of the region’s 2006 annual budget, with the launch of the first ‘Plan for 
Scientific Research, Technological Development and Innovation’. In Murcia, a broader range 
of Lisbon-oriented objectives is being reinforced through modifications to the “Strategic 
Plan for the Development of the Region” (2000-06) in November 2004.78 The changes 
introduced aim also to provide a solid basis for the design of the future Structural Funds 
strategy in 2007-13.79  
Further confirmation of the relatively close fit between future Cohesion policy priorities 
and current domestic strategies is available in the chapter on “recommendations for future 
programming priorities” in some of the UMTEs. In terms of Objective 2 regions, the updates 
for La Rioja and Cataluña provide a matrix analysis of potential domestic projects and 
actions currently available in each of the regions that both address the main development 
challenges identified in the updated socio-economic analyses and also closely fit with each 
of the priorities and sub-priorities proposed by the Commission in the draft Community 
                                                 
76 Del Castillo J, Barroeta B and Urizar I (2003) ‘Regional Innovation Strategies: The Key Challenge for 
Castilla y León as one of Europe’s Less Favoured Regions’ in Morgan K and Nauwelaers (Eds.) Regional 
Innovation Strategies, London and New York: Routledge. 
77 European Trend Chart on Innovation (2005) ‘Annual Innovation Policy Trends and Appraisal Report: 
Spain 2004-2005’, Enterprise Directorate-General Enterprise, European Commission: 
http://trendchart.cordis.lu/reports/documents/Country_Report_Spain_2005.pdf
78 Región de Murcia (2005) Adaptación del Plan Estratégico de Desarrollo de la Región de Murcia 2004 – 
2006, Consejería De Economía, Industria E Innovación, Dirección General de Economía, Planificación y 
Estadística, Noviembre 2004.  
79 Asamblea Regional de Murcia, Diario de Sesiones, Comisión de Economía, Hacienda y Presupuesto, 
Año 2005 VI Legislatura Número 37, Sesión Celebrada el Día 1 de Marzo De 2005, Comparecencia del 
Consejero de Economía, Industria e Innovación para informar sobre la adaptación efectuada, con el 
consenso de los agentes sociales y económicos, en el Plan Estratégico de Desarrollo de la Región. 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 59 63 European Policies Research Centre 
EU Cohesion policy 2007-13 & the implications for Spain: Who gets what, when and how? 
Strategic Guidelines. The País Vasco update provides a particularly exhaustive analysis in 
this respect, and concludes that all the strategic priorities and a majority of specific 
objectives within the region’s new domestic development strategy are eligible for inclusion 
within the 2007-13 Operational Programmes. 
With respect to Objective 1, the UMTE for Castilla-La-Mancha considers that the future 
strategic priorities identified by the evaluators correspond closely to the draft Community 
Strategic Guidelines and, in large measure, to the expenditure priorities currently available 
in the region’s 2005 annual budget. EU priorities targeting the labour market, which are 
closely related to social and territorial cohesion, are considered to offer the greatest fit 
with existing expenditure programmes, notably in terms of education, health, and business 
and employment promotion. On the other hand, the evaluators also note that, despite the 
availability of investment measures for innovation that address important deficits in this 
policy area, further effort is needed in establishing technology transfer mechanisms and a 
more integrated science and technology system. 
Notwithstanding these general patterns, differences amongst the regions are clearly 
evident, reflecting variations in regional specificities, levels of economic development, 
policy approaches etc. This implies varying adaptation pressures and responses to the new 
EU policy rules, not least because of the differing categories of designated EU Cohesion 
policy areas in Spain. Those regions shifting directly into the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective (i.e. the Phase-in regions and Cantabria) are expected to face the 
greatest adaptation challenge given the much more limited range of interventions eligible 
for co-financing, compounded by the highest relative reduction in funding vis-à-vis other 
categories of region. In these regions, the current programming structure is likely to be 
significantly simplified with a greater degree of concentration on key priorities in order to 
avoid fragmentation of effort. In Cantabria, for example, interview evidence indicates that 
the intention is to dedicate as much as possible to R&D and innovation, in line with recent 
domestic policy trends. With a much reduced budget, it is considered pointless to spread 
resources thinly over the large number of interventions presently co-funded. 
A potential risk for these regions is that resources will be diverted away from basic 
development activities which may still require attention. For instance, the large geographic 
size of Castilla-León and its medium population level suggest a continuing need for basic 
infrastructure, for which co-financing possibilities seem likely to be much more limited in 
future.80 On the other hand, interview evidence indicates that this may not pose as 
significant a challenge as expected given that current transport infrastructure priorities 
(i.e. for the year 2005/06) are funded exclusively through domestic funding streams. 
Moreover, comments by the Spanish Secretary of State of Finance and the Budget suggest 
                                                 
80 While significant progress has been made in recent years through the construction of motorways 
and the consolidation of the main transport networks, smaller roads are still needed, particularly to 
connect isolated centres in the North and the centre of the province of Avila. 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 59 64 European Policies Research Centre 
EU Cohesion policy 2007-13 & the implications for Spain: Who gets what, when and how? 
that provisions were made during the negotiations for greater flexibility in financing 
infrastructure spending in Phase-in regions.81
Similar challenges are present in the Phase-out regions (Asturias, Murcia, Ceuta and 
Melilla), although a more flexible margin for co-financing eligible interventions is 
permitted.82 For these regions, it vital that appropriate account is taken of the reduced 
resources available in the future programmes whilst laying the basis for a smooth transition 
to the Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective. For example, the UMTE for 
Murcia recommends a much higher degree of policy targeting in the next programme, 
concentrating expenditure on those policy areas that address EU policy priorities most 
efficiently by drawing on the lessons learnt during the current period. While basic 
challenges (notably in relation to rail and water infrastructures) should continue to be 
addressed, the evaluators also stress the need for a stronger focus on softer forms of 
intervention such as public-private partnerships in order to diminish the grant dependency 
culture. More specifically, it is envisaged that the future development model for Murcia will 
centre on four strategic lines: concentrating expenditure on the main productive and 
employment investment policy areas; refocusing business promotion policies towards 
internationalisation and the incorporation of innovation through a model based on services 
and personalised assistance; addressing desertification and depopulation through an 
integrated strategy (not only agricultural) that allows the generation of new activities 
compatible with sustainable development; and, improving the conciliation between family 
life and work in order to create jobs and increase social cohesion.   
For the existing Objective 2 regions moving to the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective, the key challenge is to increase the thematic concentration of the 
programmes. For example, the input of Cataluña to the NSRF (see Figure 31 and Figure 32) 
envisaged four Priorities (as opposed to the current five, not including technical 
assistance). These are based on the Commission’s thematic proposals and cover the 
Knowledge Economy, Accessibility, Environment and Energy, and Local Development. Whilst 
it appears that that there is a certain degree of Priority repackaging - by combining the 
previous Priorities for “business development” (Priority 1) and “R&D and Innovation” 
(Priority 2) into a new Knowledge Society Priority - interview evidence indicates that the 
intention is to raise the quality of interventions and refocus the Measures within each of 
the Priorities towards Lisbon/Gothenburg themes (e.g. by targeting energy efficiency, 
renewable energy and the protection of natural areas as opposed to traditional 
environmental infrastructure such as water treatment plants). Given the already high focus 
on such themes, the current Objective 2 programmes are well placed to adapt to the new 
requirements. Moreover, given the relatively low level of expected funding in relation to 
domestic budgets, no particular difficulties are expected in finding suitable interventions 
for inclusion within the future programmes. 
                                                 
81 Diario de Sesiones del Senado, Año 2005, VIII Legislatura, Comision de Economia y Hacienda, 
celebrada el jueves, 17 de noviembre de 2005, Comparecencia del Secretario de Estado de Hacienda y 
Presupuestos, D. Miguel Ángel Fernández Ordóñez.  
82 However, in the city of Melilla, the UMTE highlights the lack of regulatory provisions to cover the 
specific comparative geographical and natural disadvantages of such cities. 
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Figure 31: Catalan 2000-06 SPD Priorities 
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Figure 32: Catalan 2007-13 ERDF OP Priorities? 
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With respect to the Spanish Objective 1/Convergence regions, the primary challenge is to 
increase the strategic focus on competitiveness factors whilst continuing to address basic 
infrastructure deficits and other preconditions for sustainable growth. For example, in 
Galicia, the region’s situation on the periphery of Europe means that accessibility and 
infrastructure deficits are likely to continue to be an important focus of the future 
strategy. According to the programme manager, the main challenge is not so much to 
concentrate on a narrower range of Priorities - as may be appropriate in other Spanish 
regions receiving a much lower future resources - but rather to strengthen the weighting of 
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those Measures which generate greater added value in terms of raising competitiveness and 
economic activity.  
In a similar way, the UMTE for Andalucía argues that the general thrust of the future 
strategy should be one of continuity rather than change. The main objective should 
continue to be job creation, prioritising investment in education infrastructure and 
training. Increased investment in health infrastructure and the completion of the basic 
transport network is also required. In terms of the key territorial challenges, rural areas 
and those dependent on fisheries will continue to need support as agriculture remains a 
significant sector in the regional economy. Traditional environmental infrastructures (such 
as water purification and supply) are expected to form an important component of the 
strategy, although a strengthened emphasis on the forestry sector (biodiversity and 
environmental protection) is recommended. A more significant proposed change is the 
recommendation to create a horizontal programme priority for research, technological 
development, innovation and the information society for 2007-13 to address the region’s 
competitiveness deficit in relation to national standards.  
The Castilla-La Mancha UMTE also recommends a greater focus on such themes. It proposes 
a widening of the scope and strengthening of the content of the current Operational 
Programme’s objectives by redefining the priorities and moving from a relatively simple 
model of economic promotion, largely based on investment in the stock of economic and 
human capital, to one that focuses more on innovation and investment in intangibles 
(Figure 33). On the other hand, the evaluators also note that the attraction of capital and 
labour to the region will require continued and strengthened investment in transport 
infrastructure, particularly in light of the strategic territorial position of the region within 
Spain.  
Figure 33: Towards a New Development Model in Castilla-La Mancha 
Policy Scope Current Focus: 2000-06 Future Focus: 2007-13 
Human resources To create new jobs and improve the 
qualifications of the labour force 
To create high quality jobs, improve 
the adaptability and stability of the 
workforce, invest in human capital 
and to encourage equal 
opportunities 
Investment in public capital To improve the endowment of 
infrastructure 
To improve accessibility, social 
cohesion and competition between 
the different forms of transport 
Environment The protection, prevention and 
regeneration of the natural 
environment 
Sustainable development and the 
effective mainstreaming of the 
environment into other policy 
areas. 
Source: QUASAR Consultores, Actualización de la Evaluación Intermedia del POI Objetivo 1 
2000-06 de Castilla La Manch, Consejería de Economía, Industria y Comercio, 2005, p 271  
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5.3.3 Programme management and delivery 
The main issues in relation to the future management and delivery of the Operational 
Programmes which were raised in the interviews with the regions and in the UMTEs 
concerned Managing Authority status, the regionalisation of the ERDF and ESF, the 
coordination of the Structural Funds, and monitoring and evaluation. 
A number of regions are pushing for Managing Authority status to be devolved to the 
regional level (e.g. Cataluña, País Vasco, Andalucía). The update for Andalucía justifies this 
on the grounds of the further decentralisation of policymaking powers to the regions that 
has taken place throughout the current programming period in parallel with a significant 
strengthening of the Andalucian government’s administrative systems and management 
capacity. Similarly, in Cantabria, the programme manager made the point that the regional 
government had been a Managing Authority for the Interreg South West Programme since 
2000 (a function which is being extended in the next phase), and suggested that this was 
evidence of the region’s capacity to fulfill this role for the mainstream Operational 
Programme. Not all regions have been as proactive in demanding Managing Authority status. 
For example, the Madrid programme management tends to support the status quo, based on 
a model of co-responsibility between the central government and the regions. The 
designation of Paying Authority status to regions in areas lying within the policy 
competence of regional governments has also been requested by some regions. The País 
Vasco, for instance, considers that this would prevent delays in receiving both financial 
advances and the main blocks of funding, and would avoid the regional government having 
to temporarily plug funding gaps from its own resources.  
In terms of policy coordination, a number of UMTEs stress the importance of creating 
suitable mechanisms for coordinating the Structural Funds given the requirements for 
mono-fund programmes in the next programme period (e.g. Madrid, Andalucía, Melilla). 
Interviews in Murcia suggest that the programme management is strongly committed to 
this. This is also seen in the UMTE’s integration of ERDF, ESF and EARDF objectives in the 
strategic guidelines proposed for the future OP’s.  
The issue of the regionalisation of the Structural Funds is a long standing bone of 
contention between the central government and regional governments. In a joint statement 
to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Spanish Objective 2 regions have called for the 
programming of the ERDF and ESF to be regionalised in the 2007-13 period.83 A number of 
UMTEs and programme managers interviewed are particularly keen on regionalising the ESF, 
especially in light of the recent transfer of active labour market policy competence to the 
regional level. According to the UMTE for Murcia, this would allow future interventions to 
more closely match the specific needs of the regions and increase coordination and 
synergies with other regional government interventions. Similarly, the regional government 
of Madrid has, through a number of different initiatives,84 defended the view that the 
                                                 
83 Objective 2 regions meeting on 22nd December 2004 in Olite, Navarra. 
84 Memorando en Defensa del futuro Objetivo Competitividad Regional de fecha 18 de marzo de 2005 
promovido por los Presidentes de Aquitania, Las Marcas, West Midlands y Cataluña, al que se adhirió 
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programming of funds for employment, quality, work productivity and social integration 
should be decided at the regional level (in line with the European Employment Strategy) by 
eliminating multi-regional ESF programmes. A further solution to overcome the perceived 
lack of coordination between national and regional ESF programmes, as envisaged in the 
update for Murcia, is the incorporation of the multi-regional programmes within the 
regional programmes and the designation of the central government as an implementing 
body.  
A related point, although not specific to the ESF, was highlighted in the UMTE for La Rioja, 
namely the need for central interventions in the regional OPs to take greater account of 
regional specificities in order to improve the utilisation of EU resources. A similar proposal 
is made in the update for Cataluña which recommends an increase in funding for central 
government RTDI policies in the region (largely under Priority 3) given its high spending 
capacity relative to other regions. 
In terms of monitoring and evaluation, a common theme emerging from the experience of 
the current programming period is the need to improve the quantification of indicators. For 
example, a number of UMTEs note the need to set annual or mid-term targets for physical 
progress to enable more objective assessments of the effectiveness of programmes (e.g. 
Melilla, La Rioja, Cataluña) and a closer integration between physical and context 
indicators to facilitate the evaluation of impacts (e.g. Cataluña). A related weakness has 
been the lack of data on expected unit costs for physical indicators, which is required to 
facilitate the evaluation of the efficiency of interventions (e.g. La Rioja and Cataluña 
UMTEs). In terms of the functioning and composition of the Monitoring Committees, 
interviews with programme managers suggest that there is unlikely to be any notable 
changes in the next period given general satisfaction with the current arrangements, 
although some noted a need for a strengthening of the strategic dimension of meetings. 
5.4 Implications for Spain 
The aim of this section has been to review the policy and institutional impacts in Spain of 
Cohesion policy reform. In line with this, consideration was given first to regulatory and 
then to financial issues, before moving on to programme implementation and management. 
Different from the other sections in this report, there has been a particular focus on 
regional views, based on a programme of interviews with regional programme managers in 
late 2005/early 2006.  
In general, the Spanish regions have welcomed the Commission’s regulatory proposals 
relating to the future of Cohesion policy. The regional view is that they do not represent 
radical change but are rather a progression of current arrangements. While, based on past 
experience, there are some doubts about whether simplification will be achieved in 
practice, the steps taken to streamline programming are viewed positively. This includes 
the dropping of the Programme Complement, the Community Support Framework and 
                                                                                                                                            
la Comunidad de Madrid; la Resolución nº 5/2005 del Pleno de la Asamblea de Madrid por la que se 
aprobó la Proposición no de Ley 4/05; el  Dictamen del Comité de las Regiones de 16 de junio de 2004 
sobre el Tercer Informe sobre la Cohesión Económica y Social. 
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Regional Development Plans. The National Strategic Reference Framework is also broadly 
welcomed, as is the less onerous approach to Financial Tables. There is less of a common 
regional view with respect to mono-fund programmes, some feeling that this would lead to 
a less coordinated approach while others consider that the new approach is more in line 
with the realities of the situation. However, most other key changes generated a positive 
regional response: including the integration of the Cohesion Fund with mainstream 
programmes; the move to coordinate audit controls and reduce duplication in line with the 
proportionality principle; and the proposal to decentralise decisions on expenditure 
eligibility to the national level. 
From a regional perspective, the budgetary impact of the new financial agreement is 
obviously of considerable potential significance, especially for those regions losing full 
Convergence status – with Asturias, Murcia and Ceuta and Melilla becoming Phase-out 
regions; Castilla-León, Valencia and Canarias qualifying as Phase-in regions (though 
Canarias was also designated an Outermost region); and with Cantabria, a current Objective 
1 Phase-out region, becoming a Regional Competitiveness and Employment region. In 
addition, there are other potential “knock-on” effects for the regions concerned. For 
instance, nationally-funded regional incentives in Spain are currently restricted to areas 
qualifying for regional aid under Article 87(3)(a) of the EU Treaty (that is, the full 
Convergence regions); regions which lose this status may no longer qualify for national 
regional aid. In similar vein, the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund, which operates as a 
fiscal equalisation mechanism in Spain, is currently restricted to Objective 1 regions with 
GDP (PPS) per head of less than 75 percent of the EU average. 
However, within the devolved Spanish system, there is a keen awareness of these issues – 
both the direct impact of the reduced availability of the Structural Funds (and associated 
increased demands for domestic co-finance) and related impacts in terms of regional aid 
and access to the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund. There is also seen to be scope to 
take steps to offset (at least some of) their negative effects. In this context, it is 
interesting that some regions (eg Castilla-León) have already requested a change of 
treatment, while others (eg Cantabria) claim to have negotiated continued eligibility for 
both regional aid and the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund despite the change in 
designation status. It will be interesting to see to what extent and in what way national 
“buffers” will be introduced to moderate the impact of the proposed changes to Structural 
Funds flows. Certainly Spain has a number of levers which it can pull in this regard – 
relating to the domestic distribution of the mainstream Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund 
and the Technological Fund, not to mention various domestic adjustments, not least in the 
form of the forthcoming reforms to the regional government financing model in Spain. 
Moving on to consider implementation issues, the process of developing the National 
Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) is going well from a central government perspective 
(where the Directorate General for EU Funding has always played a strong coordinating role 
in the development of programmes) but has received more mixed reviews from the regions. 
While the regions were asked to make strategic inputs in the first half of 2005, this was not 
always easy to achieve given the uncertainty at the time about levels of Cohesion funding 
and the fact that not all of the domestic policy building blocks were in place. Moreover, a 
number of regions expressed some dissatisfaction with transparency and feedback levels, 
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though others viewed the process as being well on track given the uncertainties and delays 
at the EU level. Overall, the view was that the potential for a timely start to the next 
programme phase was higher than last time round. 
As regards the content of the NSRF (and the associated Operational Programmes), it is still 
relatively early in the process to be definitive other than to say that the indications are 
that there will be a significant Lisbon component to the Spanish approach. This is not, 
however, viewed as a particular challenge. The Lisbon agenda already has a degree of 
prominence in Spain and indeed within the current generation of EU programmes. The 
expectation is that there will be few difficulties in meeting the Lisbon targets set under 
Cohesion policy. If there are challenges then they will tend to be in the Convergence 
regions where the general view is that there remains a need for broader infrastructure 
support and that there may be dangers if this is diluted for Lisbon-related reasons. 
6. COHESION POLICY 2007-13: IMPLICATIONS FOR SPAIN 
In the face of an enlargement of the EU15 to EU25 (and beyond), it was clear from the 
outset of the Cohesion policy reform discussions that they would have a major impact on 
Spain, the country in receipt of most Cohesion policy funding over the 2000-06 period. As 
early as April 2001, the Spanish government wrote to the Commission President to highlight 
the statistical effects of enlargement and attempt to link the accession negotiations with 
guarantees over future Structural Fund flows to the existing Member States. 
The Commission’s initial reform proposals for Cohesion policy, published in outline form in 
February 2004, implied a reduction in the Cohesion policy budget for Spain of more than 
one half to less than €30 billion. In part this reflected the impact of enlargement and the 
associated move from EU15 to EU25 averages when designating areas for Cohesion policy 
support, but it was also due to strong relative growth performance in a number of Spanish 
regions. 
In entering the budget negotiations, it was obvious that, with the coverage of full Objective 
1/Convergence regions falling from just under three-fifths to much less than one-third of 
the national population, improving the “fate” of those regions losing Objective 1 status 
would be central to the Spanish negotiating position, as would arguments for transitional 
support to compensate for the loss of Cohesion Fund eligibility due to the statistical effect 
of enlargement. Spain was also keen to see continuing meaningful support for the non-
Convergence regions (under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment priority), as 
well as ongoing special treatment for areas facing particular geographical challenges 
(including the Outermost regions – Canarias in the Spanish context – and Ceuta and Melilla). 
Within the negotiations, the particular position of Spain was acknowledged early in the 
process, with special transitional provisions being introduced in respect of the loss of 
Cohesion Fund eligibility as early as the second Negotiating Box under the Luxembourg 
Presidency (in April 2005). Spain also succeeded in its goal of maintaining the Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment priority as a meaningful funding source, with increases in 
Phase-in funding at most stages of the negotiations (Phase-in regions account for more than 
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one-fifth of the Spanish population). Finally, Spain benefited to a major degree from the 
“special additions” made in the final stages of the negotiations. Not only was the value of 
Cohesion Fund transitional support raised to €3250 million, but an extra €2000 million was 
made available under the ERDF to enhance Spanish R&D provision while Canarias received 
over €535 million in extra funding and Ceuta and Melilla €50 million. Overall, Spain 
managed to push up its commitment appropriations under Cohesion policy during the course 
of negotiations which saw the Cohesion policy budget as a whole fall by almost 10 percent 
compared to the February 2004 Commission proposal. This represents a significant 
negotiating achievement, one where the major cutbacks being borne by Spain as a result of 
enlargement and related developments were widely recognised. 
Considering the outcomes for Spain, the sharp decline in commitment appropriations under 
each Cohesion policy category is made very clear in Section 3. As already mentioned, the 
significantly reduced funding is closely related to the changing eligibility of Spanish regions 
for Cohesion policy support. Thus, only four of the current twelve Objective 1 regions 
(Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura and Andalucía) will retain full Convergence 
region status. Of the remainder, four will become Phase-out regions due to the statistical 
effects of enlargement (Asturias, Murcia, Ceuta and Melilla), two will be Phase-in regions 
reflecting their relative growth performance compared to other EU15 regions (Castilla-León 
and Valencia) and Canarias, while also having Phase-in status, will receive significant extra 
funding due to its Outermost region status. The final Objective 1 region, Cantabria, is being 
phased out of Objective 1 support in the current period and, together with the other seven 
Spanish regions, will fall under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment priority in 
2007-13.  
These changes in status at the regional level, combined with the impact of the special 
additions negotiated on behalf of Spain, mean that the envisaged Cohesion policy cutbacks 
have a potentially quite varied differential impact. Considering the actual allocations made 
to each region in the 2000-06 period, the theoretical declines (based on the so-called Berlin 
methodology) for continuing convergence regions like Extremadura, Castilla La Mancha and 
Galicia are of the order of 35-40, whereas the cutback in Andalucia is closer to 15% due to 
the significantly lower 2000-06 actual allocation relative to the Berlin-based methodology. 
For those regions losing Objective 1/full Convergence status, two groups can be identified: 
those where the decline ranges from 50 to around 60 percent - Ceuta and Melilla, Canarias, 
Valencia and Murcia - with the first three at the lower end of the range due to the special 
additions agreed in the final stages of the negotiations; and those witnessing a decline of 70 
to 75 percent - Asturias, Castilla-León and Cantabria - largely because of the significantly 
greater actual 2000-06 allocation than under the theoretical Berlin method in the former 
two regions and the ending of transitional arrangements in the latter.  
With respect to the current Objective 2 (future Regional Competitiveness and Employment 
Objective) regions, the magnitude of decline is greatest in País Vasco, Navarra and Aragón 
(65, 55 and 50 percent respectively). This is followed by an intermediate group comprising 
Cataluña and La Rioja where the fall is in the order of 40 and 30 percent respectively. At 
the other end of the scale, the decline in Madrid (15 percent) and, particularly Baleares 
(2%), is much lower, reflecting the relatively lower Objective 2 eligible population coverage 
in the 2000-06 period. 
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Of course, an important point to make is that the actual regional distributions made under 
Cohesion policy are a Member State responsibility. In past programming periods, the 
Spanish government has influenced the regional distribution of support through the 
operation of multi-regional programmes and the Cohesion Fund. Looking forward to 2007-
13, the government has made it clear that it aims to moderate the impact of some of the 
changes flowing from the Commission’s allocation model. This issue is considered further 
below. 
As far as the regulatory aspects of Cohesion policy reform is concerned, many of the 
Commission’s reform proposals fit well with ongoing developments in Spain. This is true, for 
instance, of the enhanced stress on the Lisbon and Gothenburg agendas and also the 
increased weight attached to issues relating to territorial cohesion. Spain has also been 
broadly in favour of the new architecture for Cohesion policy and of the related shift from a 
geographic to a more thematic focus. Given its strongly devolved approach, it is viewed as 
important in Spain that regions in all parts of the country should remain eligible for some 
form of Cohesion policy support. In this context, the award of significant national sources 
of Cohesion policy funding - in the form of the transitional Cohesion Fund allocation and the 
creation of a €2000 million Technological Fund under the ERDF - are viewed as especially 
important.  
With respect to implementation issues, Spain is obviously starting from a position of 
strength given the experience and expertise gained of large-scale funding over three 
programming cycles. It is content to see the continuation of the key principles underpinning 
the Structural Funds – multi-annual planning, integrated development strategies, 
partnership, co-finance and concentration. It also welcomes the more strategic approach 
being adopted for the 2007-13 period, involving a system of Community Strategic 
Guidelines, a National Strategic Reference Framework and Operational Programmes. Along 
with other Member States, it welcomes the intended simplification of implementation 
procedures, including a more proportionate approach. On the other hand, doubts remain 
about the degree to which genuine simplification will be achieved in practice. 
Moving to the views of the regions, the ten regions consulted as part of the process of 
developing this paper generally welcomed the Commission’s regulatory proposals, seeing 
them simply as a progression of current arrangements. While echoing the doubts of others 
about the practical achievement of simplification, the proposed steps to streamline the 
documentation surrounding programming were considered positively. The National Strategic 
Reference Framework was similarly broadly welcomed as was the lighter touch relating to 
the Financial Tables associated with programmes. One area of disagreement related to the 
proposal for mono-fund programmes, some considering this to be a practical step towards 
simplification while others regretted the move away from an integrated approach. 
From a financial perspective, the regions were not only concerned about the reduced 
funding flows for the next programming period but also potential “knock-on” effects 
relating, for instance, to designated aid area status under the regional aid guidelines and to 
eligibility for infrastructure support under the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund. On the 
other hand, it is recognised that there are significant national “buffers” which can operate 
to moderate the impact of Cohesion policy changes. As discussed earlier, these include the 
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domestic distribution of mainstream Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund and the 
Technological Fund as well as various domestic adjustment mechanisms including the 
upcoming reform of the regional government financing model. 
At a more practical level, the process of developing the National Strategic Reference 
Framework and the related Operational Programmes is going well in most regions, though 
some expressed a degree of dissatisfaction with transparency levels and feedback loops. 
However, overall, the view was that it was likely that there would be a more timely start to 
the next programme phase than in the past. What seems clear too is that the Lisbon agenda 
will feature far more prominently in future programmes. As was made clear in the previous 
section, this has been happening at both the national and regional levels for some time 
now. The strong emphasis on Lisbon in the next programming period (including the 
specification of Lisbon targets) is not viewed as a constraint in Spain; rather it is felt to fit 
well with recent Spanish developments and goals. 
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